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Abstract
This thesis is a collection of three empirical essays in international trade and labor economics.
The first and second essays develop empirical methodologies to investigate the distributional
effect of globalization on labor market outcomes in the United States and China, respectively.
The first essay studies the effect of export expansion on U.S. labor market outcomes over the
last two decades at the industry level. The second essay connects new economic geography
(NEG) model with detailed individual-level data to test theoretical mechanisms linking wages
and geographic access to markets in China. The third essay investigates the role of Chinese
industrial policy as embodied in its regulation of foreign direct investment, which promotes
firm entries and exports of high-technology industries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Considerable debate exists on whether international trade has an adverse effect on the do-
mestic economy, especially on the labor market. The present work seeks to analyze the
causes and consequences of international trade. Specifically, chapters one and two examine
the distributional effects of international trade on labor market outcomes within the US and
China, respectively. The third chapter investigates how Chinese industrial policy contributed
to the export surge that followed China’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Since
the Chinese export surge has been treated as an exogenous shock to the labor markets of
its trading partners (e.g. Autor et al, 2003), it is extremely important to understand what
other factors may contribute to this export miracle. Drawing upon the foundation of inter-
national trade theory, my work applies several econometric methods to industry-, firm-, and
individual-level datasets.
The first chapter is directly concerned with the impact of trade expansion through exports
on US labor markets over the last two decades. The recent literature in empirical interna-
tional trade has mainly focused on estimating the extent to which import competition leads
to manufacturing job losses. Surprisingly, there has been very little evidence on the impact
of export expansion on job creation. In this chapter, I provide novel evidence for the United
States on the impact of export expansion on manufacturing employment. One of the main
1
contributions of this chapter is development of an instrumental variable estimation strategy
as a way to address endogeneity concerns. This strategy exploits two sources of variation to
isolate shocks to US export demand at the product level, triggered by foreign countries’ uni-
lateral trade liberalization. Using industry-level employment data from the County Business
Patterns combined with harmonized trade flows from the UN Comtrade, I find US overall
exports created nearly 0.9 million manufacturing jobs between 1991 and 2007. This positive
employment effect is about two-thirds as large as the estimated job losses attributed to im-
port competition from China. For every $1 billion increase in overall exports to the world,
US industry on average gains around 1,900 jobs.
The second chapter, co-authored with Mary E. Lovely and Hongsheng Zhang, examines the
relationship between wages and geographic access to markets based on the new economic
geography (NEG) model. The NEG models predict that costly transport and the spatial
distribution of demand affect the profits firms can earn in different locations, leading to
higher wages for workers employed in cities with better geographic access to markets. In
light of the ongoing economic integration and market reforms that occurred in China after
1995, we use three waves of Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data to measure
the extent to which the influence of market access on wages changed and affected wage
dispersion across Chinese cities over the next 12 years. Using Chinese Custom Records data
to calculate a gravity-model-based market access available at each location, we test whether
the elasticity of the wage with respect to this locational characteristic increased over time.
We find that in all three years, market access of a worker’s location has a positive and
significant influence on the wage. Consistent with extensive labor market reforms of the late
1990s, the estimated wage elasticity doubles between 1995 and 2002 and is stable thereafter.
Our estimates indicate that wages of all workers became more responsive to market forces
consistent with NEG predictions, both skilled and unskilled and those working for state
enterprises as well as private enterprises. We also provide evidence that these results are not
driven by other forms of agglomeration or by selection bias.
2
In the third chapter, also co-authored with Mary E. Lovely and Hongsheng Zhang, we closely
study the effect of Chinese industrial policy, as embodied in its regulation of foreign direct
investment, on foreign firms entry and exports. Researchers emphasize productivity growth
of China’s domestic enterprises as well as the granting of permanent trade relations as causes
of China’s export surge to the U.S. after 2000. There exists a troubling gap, since about
half of Chinese exports between 2000 and 2008 originated in foreign-owned enterprises. This
paper uses a quasi-natural-experiment approach to assess the effect of changes in Chinese
foreign investment policies in 2002, 2004, and 2007 on Chinese exports. Our differences-
in-differences analysis strongly supports the view that Chinese FDI policies are effective in
promoting exports. We find that favorable treatment of foreign investment in a particular
sector promotes entry of foreign firms that export, and that it raises export values in the
targeted industry. Results from triple-differenced analysis show that foreign-owned exporters
increase in number when such investment is encouraged and that these firms increase the
value of their exports relative to their domestic peers. Using detailed China Customs data,
we find that preferential treatment of an industry increases its exports at both the intensive
and extensive margin and is particularly effective in raising exports to the U.S. Overall,
we estimate that changes in FDI policy explain almost one-quarter of China’s export surge
and shifted China’s export composition toward high-technology industries. These results are
relevant for current discussion of how China uses investment policy to shape its international
competitiveness.
3
Chapter 2
Job Creation and Job Destruction:
The Effect of Trade Shocks on U.S.
Manufacturing Employment
2.1 Introduction
A fundamental idea in the theory of international economics is that all trading partners
benefit from trade. Although winners and losers appear simultaneously, the standard theory
posits that costs are outweighed by benefits generated by trade in general. This notion,
however, has been seriously challenged during the rapid and deep globalization of the last
two decades. Many studies document the significant and adverse economic consequences,
especially job losses, due to import competition from China or other low-income countries
(Bernard et al. (2006);Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013);Acemoglu et al. (2016)), but very
few studies find gains from trade through export expansion.
Import competition can cause job losses, but better export performance can lead to job
gains. Previous studies suggest that trade with China accounts for the loss of more than
1.5 million jobs in the US manufacturing sector during 1990-2007.1 While US imports from
1Autor et al. (2013) find that import competition from China had cost the U.S. 1.5 million manufacturing
jobs from 1990 to 2007. Acemoglu et al. (2016) find job losses of 2 to 2.4 million from 1999 to 2011 considering
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China increased substantially from $26 billion to $330 billion,2 US exports to China only
rose from $10 to $57 billion. Thus, looking at bilateral relationship only, there seems to be
no evidence of job gains from trade. The focus of the literature has been on the effects of
bilateral trade with China, even though trade liberalization induced responses that affected
US exports to many other destinations. US total exports almost double from $513 to $1,000
billion over the same period.
This paper provides new empirical evidence on how international trade expansion through
both imports and exports affects US employment in the manufacturing sector. Specifically, I
examine the effects of US trade expansions that are triggered by foreign countries’ liberaliza-
tion, which generate shocks to both US imports and exports. Regression results show that
exports significantly increase industry-level employment. Two-stage least squares (2SLS)
estimates suggest that there is a substantial effect of growing exports on US manufacturing
jobs. Meanwhile, both sign and magnitude of the estimated effect of import shocks, proxied
by the “China Shock”, are not affected when I account for foreign demand shocks to US
exports. The magnitude of the import-induced effect, however, declines substantially when
additional industry-level covariates are included. In particular, when industry-level fixed
effects are included, the coefficient on the import variable shrinks in size by almost half.
Based on 2SLS estimates, the fixed-effects model suggests that total exports created 928,000
jobs, and imports from China costed 845,000 jobs.
The empirical challenge in evaluating the effects of trade on jobs is that industries do not
randomly increase or decrease their imports or exports. There are many potential factors
that may simultaneously affect both employment and trade flows, challenging our ability to
tie down cause-and-effect relationships. When investigating import-related job losses, ana-
lysts have focused on domestic demand shifts as a potentially important confounding factor.
input-output linkages.
2Trade data are taken from the UN Comtrade Database. Imports and exports are deflated to 2007 US
dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator.
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Industries facing a domestic taste shift to cheaper products may experience both increased
imports from China or other low-income countries and domestic employment losses. Simi-
larly, positive demand shifts for specific goods may lead to both rising US employment and
higher imports in the relevant sectors.3 On the export side, analysts stress technological
shocks that raise firm efficiency and increase exports. The movement of exports and em-
ployment induced by a technological shock depends on its nature: labor-saving shocks may
reduce employment and labor-productivity-enhancing shocks may increase employment.
To overcome these endogeneity issues, I use an identification strategy that exploits two sep-
arate sources of variation to identify both import-induced and export-induced employment
effect. To capture shocks to import supply, I adopt the method developed by Autor et al.
(2013), who argue that a domestic productivity shock allowed China to increase its exports
to the US. They argue that the surge of imports from China to non-US advanced economies
reflects this Chinese productivity shock while being uncorrelated with changes in the US
domestic demand. To expand this approach to allow for shocks to foreign demand for US
exports, I exploit product-by-country variation in total import growth by a set of recently
liberalized countries. Similar approaches are used by Aghion et al. (2017) and Hummels
et al. (2014). My instrument for export growth captures shocks to foreign demand for US
exports, and thus it is plausibly exogenous to US domestic demand and supply shocks.
This study also provides evidence on the influence of import and export shocks to the average
real wage rate, real wage bill, and establishment counts. Except for the wage rate, I find
that these outcomes are influenced by trade flows as is employment; when jobs rise so does
the wage bill and the number of establishments. In contrast, I find no significant effects of
either import or export shocks on the wage rate. This finding is in keeping with existing
evidence on import competition in the recent literature: while some papers find that import
competition has a negative impact on the wage rate, others find the opposite.4
3Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016) both worry about this confounding factor.
4Autor et al. (2013) find negative effect for the US facing Chinese import competition, Hakobyan and
6
My empirical analysis is guided by Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and Hasan et al. (2012), ), in
that I combine a two-sector search and matching model with imperfect intersectoral labor
mobility. Unlike classical trade models that assume full employment, the search-generated
unemployment feature in this model provides theoretical support that allows trade to induce
heterogeneous and non-offsetting impacts on different sectors. This framework is also con-
sistent with empirical findings that import and export shocks affect employment differently;
one is not the mirror image of the other when workers can move into unemployment. The
other feature of the model, imperfect sectoral labor mobility, introduces the possibility that
different labor markets experience varying degrees of inertia.
The results complement the findings of most previous industry-level studies on the labor-
market effects of trade such as Acemoglu et al. (2016) and Pierce and Schott (2016). Unlike
previous studies, this paper accounts for both import and export shocks variables and thus
allows us to capture a more complete understanding of the direct effects of trade on employ-
ment. Feenstra et al. (2017), in work performed contemporaneously with this paper, also
investigate the impacts of imports and exports on the US manufacturing sector. Relying on
variation in foreign tariffs on US products to identify export-induced effects, they provide
estimates of job impacts that are comparable in magnitude to those found in the present
study. They analyze simultaneously with the present paper. Because different methods,
their results provide complementary evidence on trade’s labor market effects.
This paper also relates to another strand of literature studying the effects of import penetra-
tion, such as the seminal work by Autor et al. (2013), focusing on local labor markets. Autor
et al. (2013) study the effects of rising Chinese import competition on the US labor markets
between 1990 and 2007 by creating an employment-weighted5 import penetration measure
McLaren (2010) find negative effect for the US after signing NAFTA, and Costa et al. (2016) find negative
effect for Brazil facing Chinese import competition. Acemoglu et al. (2016) find positive wage effect for
industries facing import competition from China at the industry level.
5To find the distributional effects of trade, there is a growing surge of literature exploring the geographic
variation at the sub-national level. This employment-weighted measure has been widely used in the literature:
Hakobyan and McLaren (2010) estimates effects of NAFTA on wages in the US They find that NAFTA
7
at the commuting zone level, and finds that rising imports cause higher unemployment,
lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in local labor markets that host import-
competing manufacturing industries. Akin to my analysis, both Dauth et al. (2014) and
Costa et al. (2016) consider both import and export effects at the local labor market level.
Dauth et al. (2014) analyzes the effects of trade between Germany and China/Eastern Eu-
rope on German local labor markets in the period 1988 to 2008. They find that rising import
penetration caused substantial job losses in German regions specialized in import-competing
industries, and stronger employment gains and unemployment reductions in regions special-
ized in export-oriented industries. Costa et al. (2016) examine the effects of trade between
Brazil and China. They find that Chinese import competition negatively affected manufac-
turing wage growth and in-migration rates and raised local wage inequality. Meanwhile, in
local labor markets experiencing growth in exports to China, average hourly wages increased
more rapidly and without an accompanying increase in wage inequality.
In this paper, I perform the analysis at the industry level as in Acemoglu et al. (2016).
This approach contrasts with the local-labor-market approach emphasized in the work of
Autor et al. (2013). The local-labor-market approach posits that factors do not move across
commuting zones in response to trade shocks. Although Autor et al. (2013) provide some
evidence that labor is immobile in the context of import competition from China, I find
that workers who are hired by export-oriented sectors tend to be mostly younger and more
skilled in terms of education attainment, compared with workers in the import-competing
sectors. Thus, they are likely to move and search for better job opportunities across sectors
or regions in response to a local export shock. Monte et al. (2015) also find substantial het-
dramatically lowers wage growth for blue-collar workers in the most affected industries and localities. Using
state and industry-level unemployment and trade protection data from India, Hasan et al. (2012) finds no
evidence of any unemployment increasing effect of trade reforms. Moreover, their industry-level analysis
indicates that workers in industries experiencing greater reductions in trade protection were less likely to
become unemployed, especially in net export industries. Balsvik et al. (2015) also finds the increased exposure
to import competition from China has negative employment effects for low-skilled workers for Norway. Lake
and Millimet (2016) analyzes the heterogeneous impact of rising trade exposure on employment growth of
’good’ and ’bad’ jobs.
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erogeneity across locations in local employment elasticities, a pattern that can be explained
by commuting flows. Given this evidence, the local-labor-market approach is not appropriate
for the present study. The analysis, therefore, relies on industry-level changes, an approach
consistent with labor mobility across regions.
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework that is used
to guide my empirical work. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy. Section 4 explains
the data used in the paper. Section 5 provides the results and section 6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
To shed some theoretical light on the impact of international trade on employment through
both imports and exports, I consider a two-sector, single-factor (labor), small-country Ricar-
dian model with search-matching frictions and imperfect intersectoral labor mobility, based
on Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and Hasan et al. (2012). The work of Hasan et al. (2012) con-
siders an economy that produces a single final good and two intermediate goods with two
extreme cases: perfect labor mobility or no labor mobility between sectors. I borrow the idea
of imperfect sectoral labor mobility from Mitra and Ranjan (2010), where they study the
relationship between offshoring and unemployment. Following Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and
Artuç et al. (2008) The cost of moving between sectors is modeled as workers’ idiosyncratic
preferences for working in a particular sector.
The growth of international trade is not painless. Trade has different distributional effects
on different groups within countries. However, classical trade models, usually assuming full
employment, only allow adjustments to happen on factor’s prices not on the employment.
Extending standard trade models to this framework is important for at least two reasons.
First, this framework addresses the issue of whether trade creates net job opportunities.
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Though this is largely viewed as an empirical question, the model provides some preliminary
answers. Second, and we believe more important, there is the gap between theoretical mod-
eling and empirical scrutiny when studying impacts of trade on the labor market. Previous
empirical investigations, such as Autor et al. (2013) and Autor et al. (2014), find that workers
affected by import shocks from China are unlikely to search in other sectors. The other fea-
ture of the model, imperfect sectoral labor mobility, allows the domestic country to remain
incompletely specialized after opening to trade. Given the Ricardian nature of the model,
the import-competing sector, where the value of marginal product of labor would have been
lower, cannot survive trade liberalization with perfect intersectoral labor mobility. In the
more likely case of costly labor mobility (which could be due to loss of skills in moving from
one sector to another or some other idiosyncratic costs due to heterogeneity of preferences),6
the home country may remain incompletely specialized and the no-arbitrage condition is sat-
isfied for the marginal worker. These frictions generate sector-specific employment changes
and Job losses in one sector not necessarily offset by gains in another.
This framework refers to both of “push” and “pull” factors that were at play in shaping the
impacts of trade on employment. In the appendix, I show that a shock to import supply
(i.e. China Shock) and a shock to export demand could happen simultaneously. In a multi-
country world, the shock to exports may manifest as increased exports to third countries
(not necessarily China). Based on this logic, stating that exports did not increase to China
does not prove that exports in general were not stimulated. Between 1991 and 2007, Figure
2.2 shows that US total exports increased from $513 to $1,000 billion, and shared a similar
trend as imports from China. If
Based on the framework, we can test three propositions (Details and proofs are provided in
Appendix A):
6I follow Mitra and Ranjan (2010) and Artuç et al. (2008), and use a Gumbel cumulative distribution
function to capture workers’ idiosyncratic preferences for working in a particular sector.
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Proposition 1. A positive shock to demand for domestic firms’ exports in a given industry
raises employment in the same industry.
Proposition 2. A positive shock to supply of foreign firms’ imports in a given industry
reduces employment in the same industry.
Proposition 3. Positive export-induced shocks raises vacancies and wage while positive
import-induced shocks reduce them.
At the aggregate level, Figure 2.1 provides suggesting evidence. Sectors that have relatively
stronger export performance experienced less employment deduction. Figure 2.1 depicts the
employment trends for export-expanding and import-competing sectors. Export-expanding
industries are defined as industries that experience larger changes in total exports than
changes in imports from China; import-competing industries are defined vice versa. As
total manufacturing employment decreased from nearly 18 to 14 million between 1990 and
2007, job losses were relatively smaller for industries with better export performance and
less foreign import competition (a decline from 10 to 8.5 million). Industries in other group
suffered from larger employment losses, with employment dropping from 8 to 5.5 million.
Meanwhile, jobs supported by exports and destroyed by imports are also quite different.
Figure 2.3a shows the growth of import penetration from China and export performance to
the world for 392 manufacturing industries during 1991-2007. Import penetration is defined
as imports from China divided by initial industrial domestic absorption (industry’s total
production plus imports minus exports), and export performance to the world is defined
similarly. Red squares represent industries that experienced bigger change in overall export
performance than the change in import exposure to China between 1991 and 2007. The
size of each dot is measured by industry’s initial employment. Figure 2.3b does the same
exercise as Figure 2.3b labeling several top import-exposed and export-perform industries.
Both figures clearly reveal the comparative advantage of US to foreign developing countries.
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Industries facing foreign import competition tend to be labor intensive such as textile and
apparel. On the other hand, industries that have strong export performance gather in high-
tech sectors such semiconductor, biological product, and optical instrument manufacturing.
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Empirical specification
The empirical objective of this paper is to estimate the causal effect of shocks to US export
demand on employment and other labor-market outcomes. To assess the fully adjusted labor
market in the long run, I attempt to address the problem by using the “long difference tech-
nique”. Long difference estimators also increase the explanatory power of the instruments
which further reduces the finite sample bias and decreases the MSE of the estimator, as
noted in Griliches and Hausman (1986).
I fit the estimation separately for stacked first differences covering the two subperiods 1991-
99 and 1999-2007. To show this serendipitous choice of 1999 as middle year is not the main
cause that drives our results, I provide robustness checks using shorter differences with other
choices of middle years. The analysis chooses 1991 as the initial year because it is the earliest
year for which the requisite disaggregated bilateral trade data is available for a large number
of country. To avoid other disturbances generated by the Great Recession, most regressions
end before 2007 which is prior to the onset of the recession. Also, I do not find different
results in robustness checks where I widen the second subperiod to 1999-2009.
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Thus, the relationship is modeled by the following stacked long-difference specification:7
∆ lnLjt = αt + β1∆EPjt + β2∆IPjt + Zj0Γ + ejt, (2.1)
where ∆ lnLjt indicates the log change in outcomes of industry j between time period t− 1
and t. ∆EPjt and ∆IPjt measure changes in US export performance to the world and
import penetration from China of industry j between period t − 1 and t. Zj0 includes a
set of observed industry-specific characteristics to control for initial technological progress,
production structure and pretrends for each industry.8 αt is time dummy which captures
period-specific macro shocks, and ejt is the error term.
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2.3.2 Trade variables and instruments
To study the export-induced effects at the industry level, I create the baseline trade mea-
sures for export performance US manufacturing industries. The export performance variable
measures each industry’s overall export performance, defined as:
∆EPjt =
∆XUS→Worldjt
Yj,0 +Mj,0 − Ej,0
, (2.2)
where for the US industry j, ∆XUS→Worldjt is the change in exports from the US to the world
over the period t−1 to t, and Yj,91 +Mj,91−Ej,91 is initial absorption (measured as industry
shipments, Yj,91, plus industry imports, Mj,91, minus industry exports, Ej,91).
7This augmented specification builds on the work of Acemoglu et al. (2016) by considering export-induced
shocks at the level of industry.
8The controls in vector Z, when included, are each normalized with zero mean to facilitate interpretation
of the time effects.
9All variables are measured at the level of 392 four-digit manufacturing industries. Later models also use
NBER-CES employment data and are estimated with 384 four-digit manufacturing industries. All industry-
level regression estimates are weighted by start-of-period industry employment, and standard errors are
clustered at the three-digit industry level to allow for arbitrary error correlations within industries over
time. There are 135 three-digit manufacturing industry clusters encompassing the 392 four-digit industries.
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To compare and assess the export-expansion effect, I follow Acemoglu et al. (2016) and create
an import penetration variable measuring each industry’s import penetration from China,
is defined as:
∆IPjt =
∆MUS←Chinajt
Yj,0 +Mj,0 − Ej,0
, (2.3)
where ∆MUS←Chinajt is the change in imports from China to US for industry j during the
same period. To test the robustness of the estimation results to the choice of normalization,
I also create different denominators using initial employment and initial total production.
When using industry’s initial employment for standardization, the unit of trade variables
becomes dollars per worker, and the size of coefficient on the import variable is consistent
with the findings in Autor et al. (2013) where their import penetration is also measured by
dollars per worker.
The concern about the two variables measuring trade shocks is that observed changes in the
imports or exports may in part reflect domestic demand or supply shocks to US industries
that affect US import or export decisions. Thus, the identification hurdle is to find separate
instruments for both potentially endogenous variables.
As both US labor markets and trade flows underwent huge and transformative changes,
disruptive silicon-chip based technologies, such as artificial intelligence and robots, arguably
related to waves of both. On the export side, labor-saving technological upgrading may cause
fewer employment and more exports to the world. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017) find that
adoption of robots leads to reductions in both employment and wages. The work of Bustos
(2011) shows that export-induced revenues can lead firms to upgrade their technologies.
Nevertheless, labor-augmenting technological change may boost labor productivity and gives
firms incentives to hire more workers. This productive shock may also let firms become more
competitive and export more.
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Thus, to establish a causal relationship between export performance and employment, an
ideal instrument for industry exports capture changes in foreign demand for US goods that
are orthogonal to changes in American demand and supply conditions. Dauth et al. (2014)
propose such an instrument for exports from Germany to China using exports from other
advanced economies to China. They argue that the China-rise-induced demand for similar
products purchased from advanced economies avoids endogeneity issues caused by German
excess supply, such as those from technology or productivity shocks. Similarly, one could
construct an instrument for US export performance to the world by using exports from
other advanced economies to the world. However, a major concern using this strategy is
that comparable technological shocks could happen among those advanced economies and
correlate with exports at the industry level. For example, Airbus and Boeing both increase
their sales to the world mainly because of the technological upgrading by the two companies.
Hence, a good instrument would purge out the variation coming from the industry-level
technological changes or productivity shocks across the US and other high-income countries.
Aghion et al. (2017) generate several firm-level export shock measures to study the effect
of exports on innovation in France. The central idea of those measures is to identify the
variation for each firm from the world’s demand shock. Inspired by their work, I apply an
instrumental variable that only captures foreign demand shocks on US exports by exploring
the variation in the changes in imports of other foreign countries at the country-product
level.
Therefore, a Bartik-type instrumental variable for US export performance is defined as:10
∆EPIVjt =
1
Yj0 +Xj0 −Mj0
∑
s∈j
N∑
n=1
XUS→ns0
XUS→Worlds0
∆Mn←Worldst , (2.4)
10The ideal data for this paper is the firm (e.g. Longitudinal Business Dynamics) and custom (e.g.
Longitudinal Firm Trad Transactions Database) linked data like the one being used in Aghion et al. (2017),
but such datasets are not publicly available in the US.
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The summand in above equation consists of two parts.
XUS→ns0
XUS→Worlds0
is the share of US exports
sold to country n in total US exports of product s in 1991. This part captures the importance
of market n to the US for selling a specific product s. Since this structure may change due to
trade, I use the share in the initial year. ∆Mn←Worldst is the change in country n’s imports from
the world for product s over the same period. For each product, I sum across countries to get
the product-level demand shocks on US exports. At the six-digit Harmonized Commodity
Description and Coding Systems (HS) level, there are about 5,300 manufacturing products,
I then finalized the procedure by mapping each product into one of the four-digit Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) industries to get the industry-level demand shocks on US
exports.
To better understand the source of time-series variation, I then focus only on a set of countries
(N) that implemented their liberalizations recently. The list of newly liberalized countries
is drawn based on Wacziarg and Welch (2008), who update the set of countries originally
designated by Sachs et al. (1995). The criterion used to designate a country’s liberalization
is based on I pick countries that unilaterally implemented liberalization after late 1980s,
which is just before the onset of my sample period. These countries are Bangladesh, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Ecuador, Haiti, India, Mexico, New Zealand, Paraguay, Romania, Sri
Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, and Turkey.
Using the criterion to designate a country’s liberalization status based on Wacziarg and
Welch (2008), I examining those newly liberalized countries case by case. The changes in
imports among those countries are plausibly driven by the following reasons. According to
Sachs-Warner Criteria, a country was classified as closed if it displayed at least one of the
following characteristics:
1. Average tariff rates of 40 percent of more (TAR).
2. Nontariff barriers covering 40 percent or more of trade (NTB).
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3. A black market exchange rate at least 20 percent lower than the official exchange rate
(BMP).
4. A state monopoly on major exports (XMB).
5. A socialist economic system (as defined by Kornai 1992) (SOC).
Tariff and nontariff barriers restrict trade directly. A black market premium (BMP) on the
exchange rate and other political or state monopoly could have effects equivalent to formal
trade restrictions. Alleviation any of those trade restrictions could increase imports flow into
those economies.
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2016) argue that many of these newly liberalizations are unilateral
and plausibly exogenous to economic conditions of advanced countries. India’s trade liberal-
ization in 1991 was occurred as a result of IMF interventions that dictated the pace and scope
of the reforms; Columbia’s liberalizations in late 1980s and early 1990s was implemented to
reduce dispersion of tariffs across industries to a more uniform level without involving nego-
tiations over a particular tariff lines. Hence, the variation generated by import changes in
these newly liberalized countries is valid for our instrument purpose. The selected countries
are geographically dispersed, and the time of implementation of liberalization among those
countries varies in the last two decades. US exports to those economies are good represen-
tatives to US overall exports. Shipped products to those countries cover the large body of
US total exports in the initial period. The first-stage results are shown in Table 2.1.
On the import side, I follow Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2016), and use imports
from China to other advanced economies to instrument the import from China to the US.
The validity of this instrumental variable is based on the fact that the “China shock” is driven
by Chinese productivity outbreak which radiates to US and other advanced economies. This
instrument can purge out US domestic unobservable shocks. Thus, I instrumental the import
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penetration from China with:
∆IPIVjt =
∆MOther←Chinajt
Yj,0 +Mj,0 − Ej,0
, (2.5)
where ∆MOther←Chinajc is the growth in imports from China in industry j between t − 1
and t in eight other high-income countries.11 Figure 2.4 shows the first-stage results of two
instruments. Both instruments are informative and strongly correlated with variables of
interests. Each dot in the graph represents a four-digit manufacturing industry (N=392).
Lines are fitted by OLS regressions, weighted by each industry’s employment in 1991.12
On top of using instruments, I further add additional industry-level covariates to control for
technology or productivity shocks that may threat the exclusion restriction for instrument
of the import variable. I also add pretrends of dependent variable as controls to tease out
the beforehand overall declining trend that may be in part reflected in the specification.
2.4 Data Sources
The study requires information for an extended period of time on US manufacturing activity
at the industry level as well as extensive trade data. The main source of annual data on
manufacturing activity is the Country Business Pattern Data (CBP). CBP provides infor-
mation on employment, establishment counts, and payroll at the county-industry level.13
The sample includes 392 four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) manufacturing
industries that are surveyed annually from 1991 to 2007.14 For the purpose of this analysis
11These countries are Australia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Spain, and Switzer-
land.
12Details of first-stage results will be made available upon request.
13It covers all US employment except self-employed individuals, employees of private households, railroad
employees, agricultural production employees, and most government employees.
14This version of SIC This version of SIC is a slightly aggregated version of SIC-87 and combines those
industries that experience zero trade shocks with their closest industries. The version is consistent with the
one used by Autor et al. (2013) and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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county-level data is aggregated to the national level.15
The NBER-Center for Economic Studies Manufacturing Industry Database (NBER-CES)
provides additional information for the years 1971-2007. The NBER-CES contains annual
industry-level data on output, employment, payroll and other input costs, investment, capital
stocks, total factor productivity, and various industry-specific price indexes. These data allow
the exploration of labor market outcomes not reported in CBP. They also provide information
on industrial characteristics that are used as control variables, including the ratio of capital
to value added, computer investment as a share of total investment, high-tech equipment as
a share of total investment, production workers as a share of total employment, and the log
average wage. All variables are computed in the initial year at the industry-level to avoid
being bad controls. Additionally, these data permit calculation of pretend controls from
the period 1976-91, including changes in industry log average wages and share of total US
employment.
Trade data are needed to compute our main regressors of interest. The values of international
trade flows for 1991-2007 are from the UN Comtrade Database, which provides bilateral
import and export values at the six-digit Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System (HS) product level.16 To assign these product-level import flows to four-digit SIC
industries, I use the crosswalk file created by Autor et al. (2013), which allows me to concord
imports from HS six-digit to SIC four-digit. To perform the assignment of exports, I first
create a comparable export-weighted concordance table, and then match each HS-level export
value to a SIC four-digit industry. All trade data are expressed as 2007 US dollars using the
Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) deflator.
To explore heterogeneous effects across different industries, i.e., labor vs. capital intensive
15To preserve confidentiality, CBP information on employment by industry is sometimes reported as an
interval instead of an exact count. We compute employment in these cells using the fixed-point imputation
strategy developed by Autor et al. (2013). Details on how to construct the CBP data can be found on David
Dorn’s website: http://www.ddorn.net/data.htm
16http://comtrade.un.org.
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or unskilled vs. skilled, I use Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) Census Data
(Ruggles et al., 2015) for 1990 and 2000 and the IPUMS American Community Survey (ACS)
for 2006 through 2008. IPUMS data provide individual information that allows me to create
these intensity indices at the census industry level. I then assign 73 census industries to 392
four-digit SIC using a concordance table provided by Lake and Millimet (2016).
Tables 2.2 to 4.2 provide summary statistics for labor-outcome variables, trade measures,
and control variables used in estimates of the industry-level equation 2.1. The employment-
weighted mean industry faces a 0.39 percentage point increase in Chinese import penetration
per year from 1991 to 1999 and 0.99 increase per year from 1999-2007. Meanwhile, the
employment-weighted mean of industry export performance rises 0.26 percentage points
during 1991-99 and 0.74 percentage points during 1991-2007. The means of both trade
measures grow substantially during 1999-2007. Correlation of the two measures for period
1991-99 and 1999-2007 are -0.007 and -0.003. This low correlation provides extra evidence
showing that the change in the export performance measure is unlikely driven by the change
in import penetration from China at the industry level.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Estimates of trade effects on employment
Table 2.5 presents the baseline OLS and 2SLS results of the stacked long-difference model
without additional control variables for period 1991-2007. The main focus of this study
is the effect of trade shocks on employment, as shown in the top two rows of results in
Table 2.5. As the theory suggests, industries experiencing greater export expansion generate
jobs, and industries facing stronger import competition lose jobs. Therefore, one expects
a positive coefficient for the export performance variable and a negative coefficient for the
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import penetration variable.
Column 1 provides coefficient estimates for the OLS regression that includes export perfor-
mance and import penetration. The results show that a one percentage point increase in
industry export performance is associated with 0.428 percentage points increase in domes-
tic industry employment. Additionally, a one percentage point increase in industry import
penetration is associated with 0.693 percentage points decrease in industry employment.
As noted above, the presence of contemporaneous domestic supply and demand shocks may
bias OLS point estimates. Supply shocks, driven by domestic technology or productivity,
could be positively correlated with both export expansion and employment change, which
may cause downward omitted variable bias for the estimated coefficient on export perfor-
mance in the OLS regression. Similarly, domestic demand shocks on similar US or Chinese
products could lead to upward bias for the estimated coefficient on import penetration in
the OLS regression. Therefore, given the presence of supply and demand shocks, the OLS
estimation will be biased and not significant.
Utilizing the instruments outlined previously, columns 2 to 6 provide 2SLS results. Column
2 replicates the result from Acemoglu et al. (2016). This serves as a benchmark measure
that only considers import penetration from China. Column 3 reintroduces the export
performance variable. Notably, this does not change the size or significance level for the
import penetration coefficient. This supports the theory that penetration to import or export
shocks is not uniform across industries and products. As seen in column 3, the coefficients on
export performance and import penetration are both statistically significant. These estimates
indicate that a one percentage point increase in industry export performance leads average
US industry employment to grow by 0.607 percentage points while a one percentage point
increase in industry import penetration reduces average US industry employment by 1.253
percentage points. Column 4 repeats the regression from column 3 but utilizes another data
source (NBER-CES). Estimated coefficients on both import and export variables remain
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robust. Since the NBER-CES data provides employment information after the recession, I
then extend the second period to 1999-2009 to test the robustness of estimated coefficients
covering the period after the great recession. Overall, estimated coefficients remain similar to
previous results, though the absolute value of the coefficient for import penetration increases
to 1.670. This may partially reflect weaker labor markets due to the recession. First-stage
F-statistics in all regressions are well above the Kleibergen-Paap weak IV criterion.
2.5.2 Robustness checks
I consider a number of robustness checks that examine the sensitivity of my estimates . First,
I determine how much of our results are driven by my preferred specification. I consider two
alternative specifications: a first-difference model with shorter period lag and a two-way
fixed-effect model. The first-difference model with shorter lags may better capture national
macroeconomic shocks occurring within the original 9-year intervals. Columns 1 and 2 of
Table 2.6 provide 2SLS results using 3-year and 6-year period lags. The coefficients for both
export performance and import penetration are not sensitive to either specification.
Since fixed-effect (FE) and first-difference (FD) models both remove unobserved time-invariant
industry-level effects, one may expect that results from either model should be similar. This
assumption discounts one important advantage of the FE model. While the FD model must
drop the initial year of observations, the FE model preserves all observations in my sample.
This provides the FE model with enough variation to control for industry-specific trends
rather than a common trend. Column 3 provides estimation results of the FE model with
industry and year fixed effects. Column 4 includes industry-specific year trends on top of
industry and year fixed effects. Estimated coefficients from the FE model with only industry
and year fixed effects confirm to expectations and are similar to the stacked long-difference
model. However, adding industry-specific time trends produces a substantially smaller co-
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efficient on import penetration. This suggests the importance of contemporaneous shocks
that affect the growth rate of employment at the four-digit SIC level. I will carefully revisit
this issue in the next subsection.
Table 2.7 provides the second robustness check by examining each subperiod. To compare
with previous baseline results, columns 1 and 2 replicate columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.5. Using
CBP and NBER-CES data, columns 3 and 4 present 2SLS results for subperiod 1991-99,
columns 5 and 6 provide 2SLS results for subperiod 1999-2007, and column 7 shows the
2SLS result for subperiod 1999-2009. Both estimated coefficients on export performance and
import penetration are statistically significant at the 1% level during the second subperiod
1999-2007/9. One possibility for the less insignificance in the first period is that changes in
values of trade are mild, thus do not contribute much to the employment changes. Therefore,
it is mainly the second period where trade has impacts on the US manufacturing employment.
The last robustness check reports the falsification tests for pretrends. For our identification
strategy, it is problematic if the instrumented endogenous variables are able to predict the
previous employment in a significant way. Table 2.8 reports the 2SLS regression results of
the key endogenous variables on employment beforehand. In this exercise, both predicted
trade variables are statistically insignificant with the 1960s (1963-71), 1970s (1971-81), or
1980s (1981-91) employment. Therefore, the results in this table are consistent with the
hypothesis that the within-industry correlation between trade exposure and manufacturing
employment in the 1990s and 2000s are from contemporaneous trade shocks rather than
from long-term factors such as industry-level trend. I explore this idea further by including
industry-level pretrends of period 1976-1991 in the next section.
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2.5.3 Controlling for industry confounds and pretrends
A major threat to our identification strategy is that industries subject to trade shocks may
also be exposed to other economic shocks correlated with trade shocks. In this section, I
consider three groups of control variables in an attempt to deal with confounding threats that
may invalidate our instruments. The set of controls includes ten one-digit sector dummies,
industry-level pretrends, and initial technology and production structure measures.
Including one-digit manufacturing dummies as controls allows us to explore the variation
within each one-digit sector. Regressions with these additional sector dummies identify the
impacts of trade while purging common trends that influence average outcomes within each
sector. A second concern stems from the observation that US manufacturing as a share of
total employment was already declining prior to the 1990s. To rule out the possibility that
pre-existing trends for some industries confound our analysis, I add controls for pretrends in-
dustry employment and earnings: the change in the industry’s share of total US employment
and the change in the log of an industry’s average wage between 1976-91. A final category
of control variables addresses the role of technological progress over the sample period. It is
highly plausible that those industries experiencing trade shocks also are influenced by tech-
nological changes such as rapid investment in information technology. Employment changes
could be the result of domestic automation or labor-saving tech machinery. To capture these
concerns, I include initial characteristics of industries that may predict such technological
change: share of production workers in total employment, log average wage, TFP, the ratio
of capital to value added, as well as computer and high-tech equipment investment as a share
of total investment (all measured in the initial year 1991).
Table 2.9 presents results of 2SLS estimates with these three categories of controls included.
The first column replicates column 3 in Table 2.5 and serves as our benchmark result.
Columns 2 to 4 sequentially adds each new control variable to our specification. Columns 5
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to 7 always include the one-digit manufacturing sector controls and cycle among including
the other two categories. Column 7 contains all three sets of controls. Ideally, if both in-
struments are valid, we would not expect substantial changes on the estimated coefficients
after including control variables. Comparing estimates in column 7 to column 1, the ex-
port performance coefficient is largely unaffected while the coefficient magnitude on import
penetration drops nearly 35% (from 1.253 to 0.811).
As a further check to tease out confounders at the industry level, column 8 includes a full set
of fixed effects for the 392 four-digit SIC industries. These dummies serve as industry-specific
trends in our stacked first-difference model, so the effect of trade shocks on industry employ-
ment in this specification is identified by changes in the growth rates of industry employment
and trade shocks in 1999-2007 relative to 1991-1999. The idea of this exercise is the same as
running a fixed-effect model including industry-specific year trends as shown in column 4 of
Table 2.6. Including this exhaustive set of industry-specific trends reassuringly has limited
impact on the significance of our coefficients of interest. Industry-specific trends also have
a marginal effect on the size of our estimated coefficient for export performance. However,
including these trends does reduce the magnitude of our import penetration coefficient by
almost 50% (from 1.253 to 0.687). A possible explanation for why the import penetration
coefficient shrinks could be that common technological shocks among advanced economies
lead to an increase in labor-intensive imports from China. This result is in part consistent
with findings by Acemoglu and Restrepo (2017). They find that the size of their coefficient
on import penetration drops after considering technological shocks from automation. There-
fore, our preferred estimated coefficients to be used in our counterfactual analysis are from
column 8.
25
2.5.4 Comparison of estimated magnitude
To evaluate the impacts of trade on US manufacturing employment, I calculate the estimated
aggregate change in employment due to export- and import-induced shocks at the national
level based on our estimation results. Counterfactual changes in employment are defined
as changes in employment that would have occurred in the absence of changes in trade
volumes. Following Acemoglu et al. (2016), these counterfactual changes in manufacturing
during period t− 1 to t are written as:
∆Limport =
∑
j
Ljt(1− e−β̂1∆EPjt) (2.6)
∆Lexport =
∑
j
Ljt(1− e−β̂2∆IPjt) (2.7)
Equation (2.6) represents the estimated change in employment due to the change in export
performance to world, and Equation (2.7) represents the estimated change in employment
due to the change in import penetration to China. I compute these estimated employment
changes for both subperiods. ∆EPjt and ∆IPjt are changes in export performance to world
and changes in import penetration from China. β̂1 and β̂2 are estimated coefficients on export
performance and import penetration from previous 2SLS results. To consider potential
technological shocks as potential confounders, I use coefficients not only from the benchmark
result (column 3 of Table 2.5) but also from results that I include industry controls (column
7 of Table 2.9) and industry-specific trends (column 8 of Table 2.9). Numbers of estimated
employment changes using different point estimates are shown in Table 2.10.
All three specifications suggest that US total export expansion created around 0.9 million
manufacturing jobs during period 1991-2007 on average. Alternatively, job losses due to
import penetration from China differ substantially across assumptions over the inclusion of
industry-level controls or industry-specific trends. As we argue that including these industry-
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level controls is necessary, our preferred employment change estimates suggest that around
0.8 to 1 million manufacturing jobs are destroyed by import penetration from China during
1991-2007 on average.17 Therefore, the net job effect of overall export performance and
import penetration from China is roughly balanced. As part of the large decline in US
manufacturing employment can be attributed to the import surge from China, this implies
that the condition of US manufacturing employment would have been considerably worse
without export-generated jobs.
To offer a symmetric analysis of the impact of trade shocks on the US manufacturing employ-
ment, I then focus only on the trade with these newly liberalized economies. This analysis
can also provides policy implications on trading with emerging markets. Without changing
any of the instruments stated above, I replace the export performance to the world (EPjt)
with the export performance to newly liberalized countries (EPNLCjt ); and switch the im-
port penetration from China (IPChinajt ) with the import penetration from newly liberalized
countries (IPjt). The specification thus becomes as follows:
∆ lnLjt = αt + β1∆EP
NLC
jt + β2∆IP
NLC
jt + Zj0Γ + ejt, (2.8)
where ∆EPNLCjt and ∆IP
NLC
jt measure changes in US export performance and import pen-
etration from the newly liberalized countries (NLC) of industry j between period t− 1 and
t. All the other variables remain the same as in previous regressions.
Table 2.11 provides 2SLS results for equation 2.8. Column 1 includes a full set of controls,
and column 3 contains fixed effects for the 392 four-digit SIC industries. Surprisingly, the size
of coefficients on export performance and import penetration from NLC are very similar. A
one point percentage increase in export performance or import penetration from NLC causes
about one percentage increase or decrease in US industry employment. This implies that
17Benchmark result suggests 1.6 million job losses due to the import penetration from China, which is
consistent with findings in Autor et al. (2013)
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balanced trade with those NLC would cause balanced employment effect. Using the same
method to calculate implied changes, column 8 suggests that 0.25 and 0.2 million jobs were
created by exporting to NLC during 1991-99 and 1999-2007. Whereas 0.71 and 1.11 million
jobs were destroyed due to import penetration from NLC.
2.5.5 Estimates of trade effects on other labor market outcomes
The primary focus of our analysis considers the effect of trade on industry employment. How-
ever, I also investigate the effects of trade on other important labor market outcomes. Using
CBP and NBER-CES data, I explore the effect of trade on the number of establishments,
average employment per establishment, and average wage bill. CBP provides information
on the count of establishments and total industry wage bills. Based on our employment
data, I calculate the average employment per establishment and the wage rate. NBER-CES
provides information on production employment, non-production employment, production
wage bills and non-production wage bills. Similarly, I then calculate the average wage rate
for production workers and non-production workers. Table 2.12 provides findings on how
trade shocks affect these additional labor market outcomes. Panel A presents results of re-
gressions including a full set of controls, and Panel B provides estimated coefficients with
392 four-digit industry-specific time trends.
Not surprisingly, as export expansion generates jobs, it also raises the count of establishments
(col. 1), average employment per establishment (col. 2), and the industry wage bill (cols. 3
& 7). A one percentage point increase in overall export performance increases the establish-
ment count by 0.36 percentage points, increases average employment per establishment by
almost 0.2 percentage points, and increases the average industry total wage bill by around 0.6
percentage points. Conversely, stronger import penetration from China similarly decreases
all three labor market outcomes. A one percentage point increase in import penetration
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from China reduces the establishment count by 0.32 percentage points, reduces average em-
ployment per establishment by 0.4 percentage points, and reduces the total average industry
wage bill by around 0.7 percentage points. Production employment is more sensitive than
non-production employment to trade shocks (cols. 9 & 10). A one percentage point increase
in export performance increases the number of production jobs and non-production jobs by
nearly 0.7 and 0.48 percentage points respectively. On the contrary, a one percentage point
increase in import penetration decreases production jobs and non-production jobs by nearly
0.8 and 0.6 percentage points.
Previous findings do not reach a consensus on the wage effect of import penetration. Nev-
ertheless, this analysis provides some middle ground for previous studies. Based on results
in columns 4 and 8, the impact of import penetration on the industry average wage rate
are small and not statistically significant. However, the coefficients on export performance
for average production wage and average non-production wage are significant in Panel B.
Industries with a one percentage point increase in export performance reduce their average
wage rate for production workers by 0.05 percentage points, and raise their average wage rate
for non-production workers by 0.12 percentage points. Combining these two effects suggests
that skilled workers (non-production workers) benefit more in export industries relative to
non-skilled workers (production workers). This interpretation is consistent with the finding
in Lichter et al. (2014) that skilled workers are highly concentrated and demanded among
exporting firms.
2.5.6 Heterogeneous effects
Our theoretical framework introduces imperfect sectoral labor mobility that allows labor
to move with frictions across sectors. A key implication we can derive from the model is
that trade shocks have heterogeneous effects on industries with different degrees of frictions.
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Theory suggests that individual idiosyncratic preferences affect intersectoral labor mobility.
Therefore, I create two ratios as indices measuring each industry’s degree of friction using
the individual-level Census and ACS database from IPUMS. The first ratio is defined as the
number of workers between the ages 40 to 64 over the number of workers between the ages 16
to 40 at the four-digit SIC industry level in year 1990. Since younger workers tend to adapt
to new working conditions faster than older workers, a higher ratio implies that the industry’s
mobility should be relatively lower. Similarly, the other ratio is defined as the number of
workers without a college diploma over the number of workers with at least a college diploma.
This ratio assumes that it is easier for skilled labor to move across industries.
Relative to my other data sources, the finest level of industry information in the Census and
the ACS are 84 manufacturing industry codes. I map each SIC industry code to a unique
Census industry to align with our previous dataset. To better interpret the result, both
indices are demeaned and divided by their own standard deviation.
Thus, I estimate the following equation to explore the heterogeneous effects of trade shocks
on employment and wages:
∆ lnLjt = αt+β1∆EPjt+β2∆IPjt+θ1∆EPjt×Ratioj0+θ2∆IPjt×Ratioj0+Zj0Γ+ejt, (2.9)
Ratioj0 represents either the age or skill ratio, Zj0Γ adds into the corresponding ratio vari-
able, adds the corresponding ratio variable, and all the other variables remain consistent
with previous regressions. We are specifically interested in the coefficients of both interac-
tion terms, θ1 and θ2. Results are displayed in Table 2.13.
Columns 1-4 provide heterogeneous effects of trade on employment. Coefficients on export
performance and import penetration remain robust in size and significance level. Columns
1 and 2 indicate that export expansion generates relatively more jobs for industries that
initially employed an older workforce. Columns 3 and 4 imply that import penetration
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from China destroys more jobs among industries whose workforce was initially concentrated
with unskilled labors This is consistent with Autor et al. (2014) finding that low-wage and
unskilled workers are most adversely affected by import penetration from China. Although
column 5 indicates some signs of heterogeneous wage effects, columns 5 to 8 broadly suggest
that there is no significant impact of trade shocks on wages.
2.6 Conclusion
The objective of this analysis is to investigate the effect of trade shocks on US manufactur-
ing employment through import and export channels. Jobs are destroyed through import
competition from China, whereas jobs are also generated by US exporting to other trading
partners. The effects on other labor market outcomes such as the total wage bill and the
establishment count stay in line with the findings for employment. However, this study does
not find compelling evidence that trade shocks affect the average industry wage rate among
manufacturing sectors.
Despite much public focus on the job destruction from imports, the fact and assessment of
possible job creation from exports have been largely overlooked in the previous research. Al-
though most economists emphasize that trade is a win-win for all countries that participate,
the media and policy makers may have biased interpretations from the previous findings. As
a consequence, this could lead to extreme trade policies. This study tries to bridge the gap
by providing some evidence that a number of jobs actually could be created by trade.
This paper also provides evidence that trade expansion creates both positive and nega-
tive distributional effects within the manufacturing sector. Despite the acknowledgement
of adjustment cost regarding shocks on the labor market market, very few public programs
actually happened in practice.
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Finally, this paper should be a start to examine the job gains from trade. As many jobs
intimately related to trade are not necessarily in the manufacturing sector, we may expect
not less, but more job gains in other sectors.
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Figure 2.4: Industry-Level First Stage, 1991-2007
Table 2.1: First-Stage Results
(1) (2)
∆ EP ∆ IP
∆ EPIV 0.194∗∗∗ 0.0244
(0.0273) (0.0209)
∆ IPIV 0.0115 1.251∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.131)
F-Stats 25.80 45.61
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: Dep.Var. Change in Labor Market Outcomes, 1991-2007
1991-1999 1999-2007 1991-2007
CBP:
100 × annual log ∆ in Emp. -0.30 -3.62 -1.96
(3.49) (4.15) (3.25)
100 × annual log ∆ in Num Estabs. 0.41 -1.20 -0.39
(2.67) (2.73) (1.99)
100 × annual log ∆ in Emp Per Estab. -0.71 -2.42 -1.56
(3.14) (3.14) (2.56)
100 × annual log ∆ inReal Wage Bill 1.35 -3.09 -0.87
(3.55) (4.20) (3.25)
100 × annual log ∆ in Real Wage 1.65 0.53 1.09
(0.96) (1.06) (0.77)
100 × annual log ∆ in Emp. -0.08 -3.72 -1.90
(3.66) (4.44) (3.34)
NBER-CES:
100 × annual log ∆ in Prod. Emp. 0.06 -3.98 -1.96
(3.95) (4.66) (3.50)
100 × annual log ∆ in Non-Prod. Emp. -0.38 -2.81 -1.59
(3.45) (4.32) (3.04)
100 × annual log ∆ in Real Prod. Wage 1.19 0.55 0.87
(0.81) (1.21) (0.69)
100 × annual log ∆ in Real Non-Prod. Wage 1.79 0.12 0.96
(1.35) (1.68) (0.89)
100 × annual log ∆ in Real Wage Bill 1.34 -3.13 -0.90
(3.56) (4.62) (3.34)
100 × annual log ∆ in Real Wage 1.42 0.59 1.00
(0.78) (0.97) (0.60)
Observations 392 392 392
Mean coefficients; SD parentheses
N=392 four-digit manufacturing industries.
Observations are weighted by industry employment in 1991, as measured in the CBP.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics: Trade Varialbes, 1991-2007
1991-1999 1999-2007 1991-2007
100 × annual ∆ in US Import Exposure from CHN 0.27 0.84 0.55
(0.75) (1.61) (1.03)
IV for ∆ in US Import Exposure from CHN 0.18 0.60 0.39
(0.44) (1.07) (0.69)
100 × annual ∆ in US Export Performance to WLD 0.67 0.54 0.61
(1.51) (1.71) (1.10)
IV for ∆ in US Export Performance to WLD 0.73 0.13 0.43
(3.25) (2.86) (0.86)
Observations 392 392 392
Mean coefficients; SD parentheses
N=392 four-digit manufacturing industries.
Observations are weighted by industry employment in 1991, as measured in the CBP.
Table 2.4: Summary Statistics, Industry-Level Control Variabels
mean sd min max
Production workers share of employment (1991) 68.43 15.50 18.72 97.62
Capital/value added (1991) 0.92 0.55 0.19 3.52
Log real wage (2007 USD) in 1991 10.54 0.29 9.78 11.09
Computer investment as share of total (1990) 6.56 6.07 0.00 43.48
High-tech investment as share of total (1990) 8.24 4.84 1.20 18.25
Change in industry share of total employment (1976-1991) -0.03 0.07 -0.42 0.07
Change in log real wage (1976-1991) 3.57 9.94 -32.01 48.06
N=392 four-digit manufacturing industries.
Observations are weighted by industry employment in 1991, as measured in the CBP.
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Table 2.5: Baseline Industry-Level Regressions, Trade Shocks on Manufacturing Employment
Depvar = log change in employment
OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Change in export 0.428∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.672∗∗ 0.699∗
performance to World (0.107) (0.209) (0.274) (0.372)
Change in import -0.693∗∗∗ -1.238∗∗∗ -1.253∗∗∗ -1.266∗∗∗ -1.670∗∗∗
exposure to China (0.160) (0.375) (0.335) (0.352) (0.566)
1{1991-1999} -0.400 0.037 -0.368 -0.198 -0.102
(0.381) (0.362) (0.408) (0.465) (0.489)
1{1999-2007} -3.270∗∗∗ -2.582∗∗∗ -2.897∗∗∗ -2.982∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.384) (0.369) (0.403)
1{1999-2009} -4.052∗∗∗
(0.457)
First-Stage KP Fstat 78.192 45.376 48.352 74.923
Period 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2007 1991-2009
Data Source CBP CBP CBP NBER NBER
Observations 784 784 784 768 768
The dependent variable is the annual log change in each industry’s employment.
Observations are weighted by 1991 employment.
Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 135 three-digit industry level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.6: Robustness Check, Shorter Difference and Level Regressions
log change in emp. level of log emp.
∆ = 3 ∆ = 6 Level Level
Change in export performance to World 0.642∗∗∗ 0.459∗∗∗
(0.145) (0.105)
Change in import exposure to China -0.965∗∗∗ -1.152∗∗∗
(0.211) (0.235)
Export performance to World 0.531∗∗ 0.697∗∗∗
(0.263) (0.192)
Import exposure to China -1.350∗∗∗ -0.544∗∗∗
(0.341) (0.101)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE . . Yes Yes
Industry-Specific Year Trend . . No Yes
First-Stage KP FStat 66.237 23.054 17.536 222.502
Observations 5488 4312 6664 6664
Column 1 and 2 stack changes in log employment every 3 and 6 years over the periods 1991-2007.
Column 3 and 4 regress level of log employment on level of trade exposures over the same sample period.
Observations are weighted by 1991 employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 135 three-digit industry level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 2.8: Falsification Test, Trade Shocks on Beforehand Employment (1963-1991)
1963-71 1971-81 1981-91
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in export 0.219 -0.331 0.042 -0.888 -0.723 -0.527
performance to World (1991-2007) (0.445) (0.528) (0.433) (0.581) (0.515) (0.510)
Change in import -0.106 -0.241 0.231 0.189 -0.325 0.021
exposure to China (1991-2007) (0.248) (0.240) (0.310) (0.244) (0.287) (0.251)
One-Digit Sector FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 384 384 384 384 384 384
The dependent variable is 100 × the annual log change in each industry’s employment.
Observations are weighted by 1991 employment.
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at 135 three-digit industry level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
40
T
ab
le
2.
9:
2S
L
S
E
st
im
at
es
In
cl
u
d
in
g
In
d
u
st
ry
-L
ev
el
C
on
tr
ol
s
D
ep
va
r
=
lo
g
ch
an
ge
in
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
(N
=
78
4)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
C
h
an
ge
in
ex
p
or
t
p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
to
W
or
ld
0.
60
7∗
∗∗
0.
61
5∗
∗∗
0.
61
0∗
∗∗
0.
56
1∗
∗∗
0.
57
2∗
∗∗
0.
54
1∗
∗∗
0.
55
6∗
∗∗
0.
59
9∗
∗∗
(0
.2
09
)
(0
.2
18
)
(0
.1
94
)
(0
.1
78
)
(0
.1
79
)
(0
.1
66
)
(0
.1
69
)
(0
.1
82
)
C
h
an
ge
in
im
p
or
t
ex
p
os
u
re
to
C
h
in
a
-1
.2
53
∗∗
∗
-1
.2
53
∗∗
∗
-1
.1
28
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
20
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
83
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
03
∗∗
∗
-0
.8
11
∗∗
∗
-0
.6
87
∗∗
∗
(0
.3
35
)
(0
.3
49
)
(0
.3
14
)
(0
.2
00
)
(0
.2
30
)
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.2
15
)
1{
19
91
-1
99
9}
-0
.3
68
-0
.3
74
-0
.4
04
-0
.4
55
-0
.4
45
-0
.4
46
-0
.4
54
(0
.4
08
)
(0
.4
00
)
(0
.3
85
)
(0
.3
41
)
(0
.3
06
)
(0
.3
30
)
(0
.3
06
)
1{
19
99
-2
00
7}
-2
.8
97
∗∗
∗
-2
.9
01
∗∗
∗
-3
.0
03
∗∗
∗
-3
.2
35
∗∗
∗
-3
.1
88
∗∗
∗
-3
.2
38
∗∗
∗
-3
.2
40
∗∗
∗
-2
.8
50
∗∗
∗
(0
.3
69
)
(0
.3
57
)
(0
.3
99
)
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.2
86
)
(0
.2
76
)
(0
.2
79
)
(0
.3
87
)
P
re
tr
en
d
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
o
Y
es
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
In
it
ia
l
te
ch
./
p
ro
d
.
co
n
tr
ol
s
N
o
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
Y
es
N
o
O
n
e-
D
ig
it
S
ec
to
r
F
E
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
In
d
u
st
ry
F
ix
ed
E
ff
ec
t
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
N
o
Y
es
S
ec
to
r
co
n
tr
o
ls
ar
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
10
on
e-
d
ig
it
m
a
n
u
fa
ct
u
ri
n
g
se
ct
o
rs
.
P
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
co
n
tr
ol
s
fo
r
ea
ch
in
d
u
st
ry
in
cl
u
d
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
io
n
w
o
rk
er
s
a
s
a
sh
a
re
o
f
to
ta
l
in
v
es
tm
en
t
(i
n
1
9
9
0
)
P
re
tr
en
d
co
n
tr
ol
s
ar
e
ch
an
ge
s
in
th
e
lo
g
av
er
ag
e
w
a
g
e
a
n
d
in
th
e
in
d
u
st
ry
’s
sh
a
re
o
f
to
ta
l
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ov
er
1
9
7
6
-9
1
.
In
th
e
fi
n
al
co
lu
m
n
,
I
in
cl
u
d
e
a
fu
ll
se
t
of
fo
u
r-
d
ig
it
in
d
u
st
ry
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
C
ov
a
ri
a
te
s
a
re
d
em
ea
n
ed
to
fa
ci
li
ta
te
in
te
rp
re
ta
ti
o
n
o
f
th
e
ti
m
e
eff
ec
ts
.
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
ar
e
w
ei
gh
te
d
b
y
19
91
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
1
3
5
th
re
e-
d
ig
it
in
d
u
st
ry
le
ve
l.
∗
p
<
.1
0,
∗∗
p
<
.0
5,
∗∗
∗
p
<
.0
1
41
Table 2.10: Implied employment changes induced by trade shocks
Specification Description Implied Employment Changes (000s)
1991-99 1999-2007 1991-2007
Baseline, no controls Export performance to world 534 405 939
(Column 3, Table 1) Import exposure to China -500 -1183 -1683
Full controls Export performance to the world 492 375 867
(Column 7, Table 5) Import exposure to China -310 -704 -1014
Industry-specific trends Export performance to the world 527 401 928
(Column 8, Table 5) Import exposure to China -261 -584 -845
Table 2.11: 2SLS Estimates Including Industry-Level Controls
∆ ln(employment)
(1) (2)
∆ EP to NLC 1.090
∗∗∗
1.072
∗∗∗
(0.448) (0.445)
∆ IP from NLC -0.972
∗∗∗
-1.109
∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.192)
1{1991-1999} -0.062
(0.290)
1{1999-2007} -3.004∗∗∗ -2.892∗∗∗
(0.268) (0.392)
Full Controls Yes No
Industry Fixed Effect No Yes
First-Stage KP Fstat 147.016 50.034
Full controls include 10 one-digit subsector dummies,
initial technology and production controls, and pretrends.
Standard errors are clustered at 135 three-digit industry level.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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2.7 Theory Appendix
2.7.1 Production structure
The setup of the model is as follows: The final good is non-tradable, while the intermediate
goods are tradable. The final good is denoted by Z and the two intermediate goods are
denoted by Y and X. Further, denote the prices of Y and X are py and px respectively.
The relative price becomes p = py
px
. The production function of the final numeraire good is
as follows:
Z = A
Y αX1−α
αα(1− α)1−α , 0 < α < 1. (2.10)
Given the prices px and py of two intermediate inputs, the unit cost of producing Z is:
c(px, py) =
(px)
1−α(py)
α
A
= 1. (2.11)
According to the Cobb-Douglas production function of Z, we can derive the following relative
demand for the two intermediate goods:
Y d
Xd
=
αpx
(1− α)py
. (2.12)
The aggregate production functions for X and Y are:
M = hy(1− uy)LY
X = hx(1− ux)LX
, (2.13)
45
where Li is the total number of workers affiliated with sector i. Therefore, the relative supply
of the two intermediate goods is:
Y s
Xs
=
hy(1− uy)Ly
hx(1− ux)Lx
. (2.14)
Labor market clearing condition is:
LY + LX = L.
Matching function has Cobb-Douglas form:
Mi(viLi, uiLi) = miv
γ
i u
1−γ
i Li = miθ
γuiLi = miθ
γ−1viLi.
Then the probability for an unemployed searcher in sector i to find a job is:
p(θi) =
Mi
Ui
=
miθ
γuiLi
uiLi
= miθ
γ
i , (2.15)
and the probability for an vacancy to be filled is:
q(θi) =
Mi
Vi
=
miθ
γ−1viLi
viLi
= miθ
γ−1
i . (2.16)
Assume that the job destruction rate for matched jobs in each sector is: δi, the change in
unemployment in sector i can be written as:
du/dt = u̇ = δi(1− ui)−miθγi ui,
46
in steady state, the unemployment rate is constant (du/dt = 0), so we can derive the
Beveridge Curve as follows:
ui =
δi
δi +miθ
γ
i
(2.17)
Firm side Two Bellman equations each represent the asset value of a vacant job Vi and a
occupied job Ji:
rVi = −ci +miθγ−1(Ji − Vi) + V̇ ,
rJi = pihi − wi − δi(Ji − Vi) + J̇ ,
where ci denotes the recruitment cost in sector i, r is the discount factor.
Since we focus on steady state equilibrium we can impose V̇ = J̇ = 0. Moreover, we assume
free entry of firms and as a result V = 0. Thus, the above two equations imply the following
condition (JC curve):
pihi − wi =
(r + δi)ci
miθ
γ−1
i
, (2.18)
also ji can be expressed as:
Ji =
ci
miθ
γ−1
i
(2.19)
2.7.2 Wage determination
Let Ei denote the present discounted value of employment in sector i and Ui the presented
discounted value of unemployment for each worker. Each unemployed worker receives a
reservation wage b (in unites of the final good), which includes the value of leisure as well
47
as unemployment insurance payments. As mentioned above, workers also have idiosyncratic
preferences for working in a particular sector. I borrow the modeling of imperfect labor
mobility in the work of Mitra and Ranjan (2010). For individual j who works in sector i,
the idiosyncratic utility is captured by εJi . Define ϕ
j = εjy − εjx. If ϕj < 0, it is costly for
worker j to move from sector Y to sector X. ϕj = 0, ∀j, will capture perfect mobility.
Following Mitra and Ranjan (2010), I also assume that εy and εx are independent of each
other and each follows the same Gumbel extreme value distribution, which has the following
cumulative distribution function:
F (εi, i = X, Y ) = exp
(
− exp
(
−εi
κ
)
− γ∗
)
, εi ∈ (−∞,∞)
where γ∗ = 0.5772 is the Euler’s constant and κ is the scale parameter. The mean of εi is 0
and variance is π
2κ2
6
. Thus, by variable transformation, we can know for variable ϕ, it follows
a symmetric distribution with zero mean and π
2α2
3
variance, and cumulative distribution:
G(ϕ) =
exp(ϕ/κ)
1 + exp(ϕ/κ)
, ϕ ∈ (−∞,∞).
Thus, the two Bellman equations governing Ei and Ui are given by:
rEji = ε
j
i + wi + δi(U
j
i − Eji )
rU ji = ε
j
i + b+miθ
γ
i (E
j
i − U ji ),
then, can then derive:
Ei − Ui =
wi − b
r + δi +miθ
γ
i
. (2.20)
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For sector i, the total surplus, which is captured by the difference between value of match
and value of vacancy, is:
(Ji + Ei)− (Vi + Ui) = (Ji − Vi) + (Ei − Ui).
The maximization problem is:
max
wi=Ei−Ui
(Ji − Vi)1−β(Ei − Ui)β, 0 ≤ β ≤ 1
Through Nash Bargaining, the first-order condition of the maximization problem is:
Ei − Ui =
β
1− β (Ji − Vi),
where β is the bargaining power of the worker relative to the employer. Recall Ji =
ci
miθγ−1
(Eqn.(2.19)) and Vi ≡ 0 and Eqn.(2.20). We can solve Nash-Bargained wage as (WC curve):
wi = b+
βci
1− β
(
θi +
r + δi
miθ
γ−1
i
)
. (2.21)
For sector i, the key three Eqn. (2.17), (2.18), and (2.21) can determine wi, θi, and ui.
2.7.3 Sectoral choice of workers
Since unemployed workers can search in either sector, they search in the sector where their
expected utility is higher. As shown above, the asset value of unemployed worker j searching
in sector i is given by rU ji = ε
j
i + b + miθ
γ
i (Ei − Ui) = εji + b + β1−β ciθi. Then worker j will
search in sector Y if rU jy > rU
j
x, and will search in sector X if rU
j
y < rU
j
x. Since ϕ
j = εjy−εjx,
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the sectoral choice of workers is given as follows:
If ϕj ≥ β
1− β (cxθx − cyθy), then search in sector Y
If ϕj <
β
1− β (cxθx − cyθy), then search in sector X.
Given the above relationship, the cutoff value of ϕ denoted by ϕ̂ is:
ϕ̂(θx, θy) =
β
1− β (cxθx − cyθy), (2.22)
such that a fraction of 1 − G(ϕ̂) of workers are affiliated with sector Y , the rest of workers
are affiliated with sector X. We have:
Ly = (1−G(ϕ̂))L; Lx = G(ϕ̂)L. (2.23)
In the case of perfect labor mobility (ϕj = 0, ∀j), all workers must be indifferent between
the two sectors, which would imply the following no arbitrage condition.
cxθx = cyθy. (2.24)
2.7.4 Equilibrium under autarky
For each pair of px/py, the prices of px and py can be obtained from the unit cost function
of the numeraire Eqn.(2.11). Then, by Eqs.(2.17), (2.18), and (2.21), we can determine wi,
θi, and ui. From Eqn.(2.11)), we can represent px and py in terms of the relative price p:
px = Ap
−α; py = Ap
1−α.
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By Eqs.(2.18) and (2.21), we can substitute out wi and get the relationship between p and
θi:
hxAp
−α = b+
β
1− β cxθx +
cx(r + δx)
mxθ
γ−1
x
hyAp
1−α = b+
β
1− β cyθy +
cy(r + δy)
myθ
γ−1
y
.
Therefore,
∂θx
∂p
= − αhxAp
−α−1
β
1−β cx +
cx(r+δx)
mx
(1− γ)θ−γx
< 0,
∂θy
∂p
=
(1− α)hyAp−α
β
1−β cy +
cy(r+δy)
my
(1− γ)θ−γy
> 0.
(2.25)
So ϕ̂ = β
1−β (cxθx − cyθy) is decreasing in p. We also know that ui is decreasing in θi from
the Beveridge curve. Thus, the relative supply Y
s
Xs
= hy(1−uy)
hx(1−ux) exp(ϕ̂(p)/κ) is increasing in p.
To facilitate comparison of the autarky equilibrium with the open-economy equilibrium in
the presence of various degrees of labor mobility, I follow the literature and assume that
the relative demand passes through the common point of intersection of the autarky relative
supply curves with varying degree of intersectoral labor mobility. Thus, the relative supply
curve will intersect with the relative demand at a fixed point where p = p∗. The equilibrium
price ratio can be determined with the perfect labor mobility case (κ = 0). In this case, the
relative supply is zero for any p < p∗ since all workers are indifferent between working in the
two sectors. The relative supply curve becomes horizontal. Once the price ratio is set, pi
can be determined with Eqn.(2.11). wi, θi, ui, and Li can be solved.
2.7.5 Impact of international trade
When the country opens up to trade, there is a change in the relative price. Assuming home
country has the comparative advantage on sector X relative to the rest of the world, px will
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rise and py will fall after trade liberalization. Recall Eqn.(2.25), without loss of generality,
if px rises, then there will be an increase in θx, which leads to a decrease in ux. The labor
affiliated with sector X will also be affected, because Lx = G(ϕ̂)L, where ϕ̂ rises when px
rises. If we treat sector X as the export sector and sector Y as the import-competing sector,
we can have the following testable proposition:
Proposition 1. & 2. Trade liberalization will have positive impacts on the employment of
the export-expanding sector and a negative impact on the employment of the import-competing
sector.
Basically, there will be two channels causing this effect. First, a rise (fall) in the sector price
drives firms to open (close) more vacancies for the unemployed to search. Second, the rise
(fall) in the sector price will pull (push) the labor force in (out) to search in affected sectors.
The trade liberalization also affects other labor-market outcomes for different sectors.
Proposition 3. The trade liberalization leads to an increase in the vacancies (wage bill) of
workers in the export sector and a decrease in the vacancies (wage bill) of workers in the
import-competing sector.
The idea behind is very simple. Without loss of generality, since sector price rises for export-
expanding sector, the job creation curve will be pushed out, which intersects with the wage
curve at a higher wage level. This shift causes the marginal value of product to rise and leads
firms to create more vacancies, which can be approximated new entrants of establishments
or firms.
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Chapter 3
Economic integration and spatial wage
differences: Is differential market
access driving inequality in China?
(Co-authored with Mary E. Lovely and Hongsheng Zhang)
3.1 Economic Integration and Wage Inequality in China
The deregulation of Chinese labor allocation unleashed massive movements of workers across
sectors, regions, and enterprises leading to both higher wages and increased income inequal-
ity. Key policy determinants of this transformation include restructuring of urban enterprises
and massive public-sector layoffs beginning in 1995, the gradual erosion of constraints on
rural-to-urban migration, especially after 2000, and adoption of the 2004 Labor Law,1 which
remade employer-employee relations and expanded employment flexibility. Due in part to
these reforms, the nominal annual wage of urban workers increased from 5,500 yuan in 1995
to 25,000 yuan in 2007, with an 11.4 percent per annul real growth rate (NBS 2008).2
1Gallagher and Jiang (2002) provide an overview and analysis of the Labor Law of the People’s Republic
of China.
2Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) report that mean annual real wages increased at an annual rate of 14 percent
from 1997 to 2003.
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This wage growth was accompanied by rising inequality across a variety of dimensions. Li
and Sicular (2014) report that despite many national policies with explicitly distributional
aims, income inequality in China increased substantially from the mid-1990s through to
2008. Patterns familiar from Western wage profiles, once largely absent, now appear in
Chinese wage data. The return to education, low by international standards in the 1980s,
rose dramatically during the period of rapid labor market reform. Appleton et al. (2005)
examine the determinants of urban wages in China from 1988 to 2002 and find increased
returns to education but a decrease in the returns to experience. During the same period,
gender wage inequality also worsened. Li and Sicular (2014) use individual survey data to
find that compared to the wages of female workers with similar observable characteristics,
the wages of male workers were 10.5 percent higher in 1995, 17.4 percent higher in 2002,
and almost 29.7 percent higher in 2007. At the same time, distinct features of the planned
economy have eroded: Démurger et al. (2012) find that earnings gaps between the public
and private sectors decreased in urban China between 2002 and 2007.
The unleashing of market forces also increased spatial wage dispersion in China. Knight
and Song (2008), through an analysis of data from household surveys, find that about 11
percent of urban wage inequality is explained by the province in which the worker is em-
ployed. Gustafsson et al. (2008) report that in 2002, 19 percent of urban income inequality
could be attributed to provincial differences in mean incomes. These nominal wage differ-
ences were offset to some extent by higher living costs in those cities experiencing rapid
growth. Li and Sicular (2014) report that adjusting for spatial price differences among cities
and incorporating rural-urban migrants into inequality calculations both reduce estimated
inequality.
The emergence of such large spatial wage differences presents a puzzle. If China’s product
and factor markets are integrating internal and internationally, why are spatial wage gaps
growing instead of shrinking? This question was first addressed by Hering and Poncet (2010),
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who use new economic geography (NEG) to argue that spatial differences in nominal wages
are driven by variation across cities in access to domestic and international goods markets.
Using empirical methods grounded in NEG theory and pioneered by Redding and Venables
(2004), Hering and Poncet estimate wage equations and find strong evidence of a positive
relationship between individual nominal wages in 1995 and the market access of the worker’s
location. They also find that this relationship is stronger for skilled workers and for those
employed by foreign-invested firms. Key innovations of the Hering and Poncet approach
are their use of detailed Chinese customs data to estimate market access by the Redding-
Venables method and their use of microdata from the Chinese Household Income Project
(CHIP) for the wage equation.
While they speculate that deeper integration may worsen spatial wage disparities, Hering and
Poncet (2010) investigate the relationship in 1995 only. The following six years witnessed
extensive layoffs of urban state employees, rapid entry of private firms, and permanent
reductions in international trade barriers. Kamal, Lovely, and Ouyang (2012) revisit the
relationship between market access and wages in their study of 2002 wages in China. They
find that nominal wages are strongly influenced by the market access of the worker’s location
in both 1995 and 2002.3 In particular, they find that the estimated elasticity of the wage
with respect to market access of the worker’s location more than doubles over the period. A
shortcoming of the study, however, is its use of the ad hoc Harris measure of market access,
necessitated by a lack of access to detailed Chinese trade data.
We extend the analysis of spatial wage differentials in China by employing the NEG method
of Redding and Venables (2004) using detailed customs data for 2002 and 2007 and by
estimating Mincerian wage equations with microdata on Chinese workers from the CHIP.
3Kamal, Lovely, and Ouyang (2012) are also able to investigate the presence of real wage differences using
data on local living costs available for 2002 only. Interestingly, they find evidence of real wage convergence
within provinces, but not between provinces. Their results suggest that higher nominal wages made possible
by the cost advantages of central locations attract workers from other parts of the same province, transferring
spatial advantages to fixed local factors, such as land and fixed housing stock. Cross-province migration does
not appear to be free enough at that time to provide real wage equalization across provinces, however.
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Our goal is to link cross-city variation in wages to spatial differences in access to markets, with
a particular focus on how the intensity of this relationship has changed over time and among
different groups of workers. Beyond its contribution as further evidence of the empirical
relevance of NEG models, this analysis documents the progression of market forces in shaping
China’s domestic factor prices and, thus, bears further witness to the transformation of
economic relations within the country.
A notable feature of our analysis, as in Hering and Poncet (2010), is its reliance on detailed
information on trade flows among Chinese provinces and between the provinces and foreign
countries, as needed to implement the Redding-Venables (2004) empirics. The benefit of
this approach is twofold. First, the resulting estimating equations are closely linked to the
underlying theory, allowing estimated coefficients to be interpreted as structural parameters.
Second, the gravity-like regressions used to measure market access provide useful information
in their own right, on both the trade-diminishing influence of distance and on the extent of
internal and external barriers to Chinese exports.
We estimate the strength of the hypothesized relationship between local market access and
local wages using the 1995, 2002, and 2007 waves of the Chinese Household Income Project
(CHIP). With these three cross-sections, we chart the influence of market access on wages
over a period of intense domestic reforms and international integration. We are able to test
whether this relationship differs by a worker’s skill level or type of employer. Special features
of the 2007 CHIP survey allow us to assess whether one form of selection bias affects our
estimates. We address endogeneity concerns caused by inclusion of the worker’s own-location
in market access calculations. Lastly, we examine the economic significance of our predicted
spatial differences by estimating the wage gains possible by a worker’s relocation from one
city to another and by comparing actual wage dispersion to a counterfactual without spatial
variation.
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3.2 New Economic Geography Models and their Ap-
plication to China
3.2.1 New economic geography empirics
New Economic Geography models emphasize the interplay of transport costs and plant-
level increasing returns to scale. Helpman and Krugman (1985) and (Krugman, 1991) use
the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic competition to derive a relationship between the
distribution of expenditure across trading economies and the distribution of production.
Plant-level scale economies imply that firms find it most profitable to concentrate production
at one location, with that location chosen to minimize transportation costs to the firm’s
geographically dispersed markets. Redding and Venables (2004) show that the potential net
profits earned in each location are a log-linear function of the location’s “market access,”
which is essentially a discounted sum of local and foreign expenditures available to the firm.
Predictions of the model for production and factor prices depend on the full general equilib-
rium. If factor price equalization (FPE) obtains in equilibrium, Behrens et al. (2004) provide
tests of the model appropriate for a multi-country world.4 The model predicts that larger
and more centrally located countries attract a disproportionate share of firms and account
for a disproportionate share of production. This approach is applied to data from 57 Euro-
pean regions over the period 1985-2000 by Head and Mayer (2006), who find little support
for the model characterized by FPE. More recently, Niepmann and Felbermayr (2010) in-
vestigate the implications of the Behrens et al. model for the response of production shares
to decreasing trade costs. Using data from 20 OECD countries for 1980 to 1999, they find
that the distribution of firms across countries becomes increasingly skewed as trade becomes
freer, a finding consistent with the model’s theoretical predictions.
4Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano and Tabuchi (2009) provide predictions for the case in which FPE does
not hold.
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Because these approaches rely on FPE, they are not appropriate for a study focused on
regional disparities in China. As noted above, wages are not equalized across Chinese regions;
studies using individual data have found a strong relationship between a worker’s location
and his or her wage. An alternative approach is provided by Redding and Venables (2004),
who focus on how market access influences wages in a world in which FPE does not obtain.
In equilibrium, wages in places with better market access are higher so that profits are
equalized across locations and firms have no unilateral incentive to move. Redding and
Venables apply this approach to an analysis of variation in GDP per capita across 110
countries, from 1992 to 1996, and find evidence consistent with the theory. Similarly, Head
and Mayer (2006) investigate the dispersion of average wages across European regions and
obtain results consistent with the NEG prediction.
The NEG model provides a formal derivation of market access, showing its dependence
on expenditures in each potential market, the number of potential competitors at these
locations, and the prices they charge. A significant innovation in Redding and Venables
(2004) is to embody this structural relationship in a gravity-like model and to use it to
estimate both market capacity of potential trading partners and the effect of physical distance
on trade. Head and Mayer (2006) distinguish this structurally derived market access measure
from the Harris (1954) formulation, which implicitly treats competitors and prices as the
same across all locations.5
In their analysis of 1995 Chinese urban wages, Hering and Poncet (2010) make an important
technical contribution by combining an analysis of individual, rather than average, wage
levels with the Redding-Venables measure of market access.6 They estimate a gravity model
using geographically detailed Chinese trade data. Their procedure entails the use of bilateral
5Head and Mayer (2006) use “real market potential” to refer to the Redding-Venables “market access”
measure and “nominal market potential” to refer to the Harris measure.
6In a recent paper, Fally et al. (2010) also estimate the impact of market access on wages controlling for
individual worker characteristics. They find a positive and significant effect of market access on wages across
Brazilian states and industries.
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trade data at the provincial level merged with trade flows of foreign countries. This procedure
requires access to restricted China Customs records of import and export values to or from
each province to all international partners.
3.2.2 Liberalization and the strength of the market-access Effect
While Hering and Poncet (2010) provide evidence that access to markets influenced Chinese
wages as early as 1995, given the extensive changes in Chinese commercial policy and labor
market regulation that followed, we predict that market access became a more powerful
determinant of spatial wage inequality over the next decade. Our prediction rests on two
observations about policy changes in China occurring over this horizon, in addition to the
reductions in international trade frictions embodied in China’s WTO accession in 2001. First,
central government policies to promote interprovincial trade and expansions in domestic
infrastructure substantially reduced internal trade frictions, strengthening the relationship
between domestic factor prices and access to domestic markets. Secondly, Chinese labor
market reforms better allowed market forces to determine wages. We briefly review changes
in Chinese commercial policy and labor market regulation between 1995 and 2002 to support
these claims.
Branstetter and Lardy (2008) describe in detail China’s changing trade and investment
policy in the second half of the 1990s and the geographic widening of foreign commercial
relationships. China undertook significant unilateral trade liberalization in anticipation of
WTO accession. The government also made far-reaching changes to its FDI regime, greatly
expanding the freedom with which foreign firms could operate in China. Branstetter and
Lardy conclude, “The view of the export sector as an enclave with little connection to the
local economy became increasingly out of date by the eve of China’s accession to the WTO”
(p. 638).
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Branstetter and Lardy (2008) also question the depiction of China’s internal markets as
deeply fragmented. While a number of studies document the extent of interprovincial protec-
tionism and market fragmentation (Young (2000); Wedeman (2003); Poncet (2003), Poncet
(2005)), Bai et al. (2004) and Holz (2009) provide extensive analysis of industrial specializa-
tion, interprovincial trade, and inter-city price dispersion to contradict this characterization.
Branstetter and Lardy weigh the conflicting evidence and find that, “international integra-
tion appears to be proceeding along with intra-national integration.” If these assessments
were accurate, urban wages would be increasingly influenced over the period by enhanced
access to domestic, as well as foreign, markets.
While adjusting to these extensive commercial policy reforms, Chinese workers were also
subject to seismic changes unleashed by labor reforms. As noted by Cai, Park, and Zhao
(2008), the 1994 Labor Law facilitated the massive restructuring of state-owned enterprises,
leading to layoffs of at least 10 million workers by 1997 and 27 million more from 1998 to
2004.7 Giles, Park, and Zhang (2005) estimate that the unemployment rate for all urban
residents rose from 6.8 percent in 1996 to 11.1 percent in 2002. Workers remaining in the
state sector were subject to removal of most administrative controls on compensation. Thus,
over the period, labor markets were largely freed from regulatory controls, again suggesting
that market- determined spatial advantages would be increasing reflected in wages over time.
3.3 Theoretical Framework and Estimating Equations
3.3.1 Theoretical framework
The NEG framework leads to the prediction that wages will be higher in locations with
better market access, or that the estimated coefficient for a market access measure in a
7See Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008) for details of SOE restructuring and analysis of labor market responses.
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wage regression will be positive and statistically significant. To provide the NEG model
mechanics succinctly, we provide a parsimonious discussion of the Redding and Venables
(2004) framework.
Assume there are K+1 industries of which K are differentiated manufactured goods that
exhibit internal economies of scale and imperfect competition.8 Products are traded across
R locations. Preferences of the representative agent at location j for differentiated products
takes the form of a CES aggregator:
Uj =
[
R∑
r=1
∫
nr
xrj(z)
(σ−1)/σdz
]
=
[
R∑
r=1
nrx
(σ−1)/σ
rj
]
, σ > 1
where σ is the elasticity of substitution between products, nr is the number of firms operating
in this location, and xrj is the xrj is the product selling from location r to j. Maximizing
utility function subject to a given level of expenditure Ej, we get the inverse demand function,
xrj = p
−σ
rj
Ej
G1−σj
, (3.1)
where the price index is Gj =
[∑R
r=1 nrp
1−σ
rj
]1/(1−σ)
.
The firm’s profit at location r is:9
πr =
R∑
r=1
(prjxrj)/Trj − (f + xr)cr, (3.2)
where Trj is an iceberg transport cost, and crf is the plant-specific fixed cost. Profit
maximizing firms set a single mill price, which is a constant mark-up over marginal cost,
8As Redding and Venables (2004) note, manufacturing can be interpreted as a composite of manufacturing
and service activities, while the homogeneous good sector is interpreted as agriculture.
9Empirical studies of market access treat total expenditure as exogenous, but the full general equilibrium
of the model determines total income endogenously, as in Fujita et al. (1999).
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pr = cr(σ/σ − 1). Entry forces profits to zero and firms break even if their total sales meet
the condition,
∑
j xrj = (σ − 1)f ≡ x̄. Firms sell this many units if they price so that:
p−σr x̄ =
∑
j
T 1−σrj EjG
σ−1.
j (3.3)
3.3.2 Deriving the wage equation
Equation (3) informs us that the revenue earned by local firms, and hence the maximum
amount they are able to pay for factor inputs, is constrained by its access to consumers.
We can express the relationship between the spatial distribution of expenditure and local
wages by adding a bit more structure. As in Redding and Venables (2004), we assume that
there are three kinds of inputs, combined in a Cobb-Douglas technology. The first input is a
composite intermediate good, with price Gr and input share α. The second is an immobile
primary input, labor, with price wr and input share β. The third is an international mobile
factor, with price vr and input share γ. Using these assumptions about costs and the mark-up
pricing rule, the unit cost that firms located in region r are able to bear is:
(Gαrw
β
r v
γ
r )
σ = A
∑
j
T 1−σrj EjG
σ−1
j = A(MAr), (3.4)
where MAr is the market access of location r, which depends on the market capacity of
potential markets (EjG
σ−1
j ) and trade costs T
1−σ
rj , and A combines constants. Equation
(4) indicates that the wage is a log-linear function of market access and the prices of other
inputs.10
An important feature of the NEG model is that MAr depends not only on the expenditure
available at each potential market, Ej, but also on the intensity of competition there, em-
10Redding and Venables (2004) also calculate a supply-access measure, using exporter rather than importer
fixed effects from the gravity model estimation. Their market access and supplier access measures are highly
correlated with each other and they do not use them both in their main regressions.
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bodied in the term Gσ−1j , which captures the number of competing firms at that location
and the prices they charge. Head and Mayer (2004) discuss the relationship of the MA term,
as derived from NEG theory, and various alternatives used in empirical applications. One
alternative, the Harris index, used by Kamal et al. (2012) among others, omits the price
index, implicitly treating it as the same at all locations. Head and Mayer note that this
omission effectively severs the link between such empirical formulations and the underlying
profit function (2).
Taking the log of equation (4) allows us to express the wage as a linear function of the
location’s market access: lnwr = a + b lnMAr + c lnGr. The price of the internationally
mobile factor is included in the constant term, as it does not vary across local areas.
To estimate this wage-market access relationship using information on individual workers,
we include controls for worker characteristics. Additionally, we allow for local differences
in the price of intermediate inputs and technical efficiency by including fixed effects for
the region-sector of employment. A residual captures stochastic deviations from these M̂A
regional averages. With these considerations and substituting predicted market access, MA,
for actual values, we estimate wage equations of the form:
lnwi = α + b lnMAi + χ+ z
′
iι+ εi, (3.5)
where χ is a vector of region-sector dummies, z′i is a vector of individual characteristics and
εi is a random error. Equation (5) is a standard Mincer (1974) wage equation, with the
inclusion of the MA term. The NEG prediction is that the estimated coefficient on MA
will be positive and statistically significant and we use this estimate to gauge the influence
of market access on Chinese wages. We can interpret the estimated value of b using the
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structural parameters of the model, with b = 1/βσ, where β is the labor share in production.
The estimated coefficient, b, can be combined with labor-share values from the literature to
produce an estimate of σ.
3.3.3 Deriving the gravity equation
The model also provides a method of estimating market capacities and the deflation factor
for bilateral distance. The value of sales from region r to j can be written as:
Xrj = nrprjxrj/Trj = nrp
1−σ
r T
1−σ
rj G
σ−1
j Ej (3.6)
Taking logs, we obtain the standard gravity formulation,
lnXrj = FXr + FMj + ln(T
1−σ
rj ). (3.7)
The influence of trade costs, captured by T 1−σrj , can be decomposed into a number of elements,
including border effects and contiguity. Thus, we estimate a gravity model of the form,
lnXrj = FXr + FMj + δlndistrj + ϕB
foreign
rj,rorj∈China + ϕ
∗Bforeignrj,r&j∈ROW (3.8)
+Ψcontigrj + θB
provincial
rj,r 6=j,r&j∈China + ξB
intranational
rj,r=j∈ROW + ε
where Xrj denotes total value of exports from province/country r to province/country j. FXr
is an exporter fixed effect, capturing the exporter’s supply capacity. FMj is an importer
fixed effect, reflecting market capacity of importer j, and distrj denotes great circle distance
between partner r and j. Log of trade costs for flows between a Chinese province and a
foreign country are calculated as δlndistrj + ϕ + Ψcontigrj; for flows between two foreign
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countries as δlndistrj + ϕ
∗ + Ψcontigrj;for flows between a Chinese province and the rest of
China as σlndistrj + θ; for flows from a foreign country to itself as σlndistrj + ξ; and for
flows from a Chinese province to itself as σlndistrj. We estimate the gravity equation (8),
recover the needed parameters, and use them to calculate each city’s market access.
3.4 Data and Calculating Market Access
3.4.1 Data used for wage equation
The micro-level data we use to estimate the wage equation (5) comes from the China House-
hold Income Project (CHIP), provided by the Institute of Economics at the Chinese Academy
of Social Sciences. We use three waves of these surveys: 1995, 2002, and 2007. The CHIP is
a nationally representative survey, with the urban sample collected by the National Bureau
of Statistics (NBS). It provides comprehensive information on income sources, individual
characteristics, and labor force status. It also has a wide geographic coverage. (Table A.1
provides a list of the provinces and cities included in each CHIP round). Importantly for this
study, the survey includes the location of each worker, allowing us to match each individual
to a specific city. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the three samples.
As in Hering and Poncet (2010) and Kamal, Lovely, and Ouyang (2012), our dependent
variable, log hourly wage, is computed from annual primary income divided by annual total
working hours in 1995 and 2002. Because the CHIP changed the questionnaire after 2007,
for this sample year we calculate the hourly wage from monthly wage divided by average
working hours per month. To focus on those with stable employment, we further restrict
our sample to those who are between the ages of 16 and 65, worked more than 20 hours per
week, and stayed employed during the sampled period.
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We maintain a consistent set of control variables across sample years, including as covariates
sex, years of schooling, age, ownership type of the workers’ employer, occupational dummies,
and sector by region fixed effects, all of which appear in each CHIP wave. Employer own-
ership types are state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, state-foreign enterprises, sole
foreign-owned enterprises, collectives, and others. We also create indicator variables for the
sector in which the individual is employed (primary, secondary, or tertiary) and the region
in which the worker is located.
3.4.2 Data used for gravity equation
To estimate gravity equation, we rely on several sources of data to measure intra- provincial,
inter-provincial, intra-national, and international export values. Without direct measures
of within-China trade, estimates of these flows must be derived from Chinese provincial
and interprovincial input-output tables.11 Chinese provincial input-output tables, which are
released every five years, provide a decomposition of provincial output, international trade,
and domestic trade.12 We calculate intra-provincial exports as domestic production minus
total exports. Production data for each province is drawn from the same source and it is the
sum of industrial and agricultural output, converted from yuan to current US dollars.13
Interprovincial exports, defined as exports from one province to the rest of China, are mea-
sured by domestic trade of tradable goods in provincial input-output tables. This method
treats the rest of China as a super province, with characteristics generated using characteris-
tics of the provinces that comprise it. Intra-national trade flows for foreign partner countries
are calculated using input-output tables for each country.
We calculate international trade between each province and foreign partners using Chinese
11This method for calculating provincial flows follows the method used by Hering and Poncet (2010).
12Specifically, we use provincial IO tables for 1997, 2002, and 2007.
13We convert RMB to US dollars using exchange rates from the World Development Indicators.
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Custom Records, provided by China’s General Administration of Customs. This source re-
ports Chinese foreign trade flows, with the source or receiving province noted. The Comtrade
database is the source of international trade data for all other countries.14 Export values are
expressed in 1995 US dollars.
3.4.3 Measuring market access
To create the variable of interest, market access for each city c, we recover the needed
parameter estimates from the gravity equation and use them in the following equation:
MAc = dist
σ
cc
yc
yk′
eFMk′ +
∑
k∈Province
distσck
yk∑
yk′
eFMk′ (3.9)
+
∑
l∈China
distσcl
yl∑
yl′
eθ+FMl
+
∑
j∈ROW
(distcp + distpj)
σe(ϕ+Ψcontig)eFMj .
The first to fourth terms are local market access, within-provincial market access, national
market access, and international market access, respectively. The first term is the product of
the weighted distance of a city to itself, the ratio of city c’s GDP to the total provincial GDP,
and the exponential to the value of the province’s importer fixed effect. The second term
is the within- provincial market access, calculated as the sum of the products of weighted
distance between city c and city k, the ratio of city k’s GDP to provincial GDP, and the
province’s importer fixed effect. The third term is constructed similarly, with the addition
of a between-province border effect when calculating the summands. For the fourth term,
we consider both the province- foreign border effect and contiguity effect. We calculate the
14Scott Baier and Jeffrey Bergstrand kindly provided these trade data and a set of foreign country charac-
teristics. These data are publicly available at http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/bdd_modele.
asp.
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distance between a Chinese city and a foreign country as the sum of the distance between
the city and the closest international port and the distance between this port and the foreign
country’s capital.
Figure 3.1 shows the average market access for Chinese cities in 1995, 2002, and 2007, each
calculated using parameters estimated with year-specific gravity models. The total market
access (MA) measure rises smoothly from 1995 to 2007. While no decomposition is available
for 1995, we are able to decompose market access into parts for 2002 and 2007, based on
the location of markets. It is clear from Figure 3.1 that local MA, defined as access to the
market of the city itself, and interprovincial MA, defined as the discounted market access
to Chinese cities in other provinces, drive the increase in average market access from 2002
to 2007. The discounted value of international markets does not increase noticeably over
the period, the result of the slow growth of foreign markets relative to China’s own internal
markets.15
3.5 Estimation Results
3.5.1 Gravity model parameters
The market access measures summarized in Figure 3.1 are constructed using the estimated
parameters from year-specific gravity models. The values of these parameters are of interest
in their own right, as they indicate how relative trade costs associated with local and in-
ternational borders changed over time. Table 3.2 provides estimated coefficients for gravity
15Kamal, Lovely, and Ouyang (2012) calculate market access for 1995 and 2002 using an ad hoc measure
that discounts the GDP of potential markets by distance. Using this alternative method of measurement,
they also find that growth in the average value of MA for Chinese cities is due to growth in domestic markets.
The distance- discounted value of foreign markets increased only slightly over the five-year interval.
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models estimated for 1997, 2002, and 2007.16 Interestingly, the elasticity of export sales with
respect to distance- to-market is very stable over time. The estimated distance coefficient is
close to -1.5 in all three years. These results indicate no significant change in the attenuating
effect of distance on bilateral trade flows over the ten-year span of the analysis.
Also of particular interest to this study is the estimated effect on bilateral exports of an
international border versus an internal provincial border. Using 1997 data, Hering and
Poncet (2010) estimate an internal border effect for China that is three-quarters as large as
the trade- reducing effect of an international border, as shown in column 1 of Table 3.2 and
computed as the ratio of the coefficient for an intra-China border (-2.766) to the coefficient
for a china-foreign border (-3.681).17 Their estimates are consistent with the existence of
significant borders to cross-provincial trade, as found in Poncet (2005). Such a large internal
border effect reduces the market access of western Chinese cities relative to those on the
coast, as it diminishes their effective proximity to expenditures in eastern cities. However,
domestic reforms appear to have greatly reduced this inland “border effect,” as we find no
statistically significant effect of internal borders on trade flows within China in 2002 and
2007, with much smaller point estimates. These results are consistent with the integration
of domestic markets that Branstetter and Lardy (2008, p. 639-640) claim proceeded apace
with international integration over the course of the 1990s.
Another interesting implication of the estimated gravity parameters concerns the strength
of border effects between China and its foreign trading partners. In the 1997 Hering-Poncet
estimates, the border effect associated with bilateral trade between China and a foreign
partner was 2.13 times the border effect associated with bilateral trade between one foreign
16Hering and Poncet (2010) estimate a gravity model using 1997 data because the detailed China Customs
Records (CCR) that provide province-to-international-partner trade values were not available for the year
of the CHIP sample, 1995. We do not have access to the 1997 CCR data and we display their gravity
parameters in Table 3.2.
17These coefficients express the estimated effect on trade of a given type of border relative to the left-out
category, which is within-province trade. Because each cross-section is estimated in a separate regression,
the magnitude of border effects cannot be directly compared across sample years. Rather, one must compare
the relative effect of different types of borders across years.
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partner and another (3.681/1.731). Our new gravity estimates indicate that by 2002 dif-
ferences in the average border friction between China and a foreign partner had moderated
to 1.25 times (5.971/4/755) the border friction between two foreign partners. Further, our
estimates suggest that these differences were eliminated by 2007, as we find no statistically
significant difference in border effects for China-foreign and foreign-foreign trade in that
year.
The graphs in Figure 3.2 illustrate the unconditional relationship between the estimated
market access measures created with our gravity parameters and the average wage for cities
in each CHIP sample. In all three years, a clear positive relationship between these two
variables is evident. However, the characteristics of workers in any given pair of cities may
differ, and the migration of more highly educated people to coastal cities may produce this
positive correlation. Therefore, we now turn to Mincer wage equations, in which we control
for individual wages and other factors to see if this unconditional relationship is robust to
the inclusion of additional covariates.
3.5.2 Market access and individual wages
Results of estimating the Mincer wage regressions described in equation (5) indicate the con-
tinuing influence of proximity to markets on local wages. Table 3.3 provides estimates that
control for sector and occupation, in addition to a rich set of individual characteristics. We
cluster robust standard errors at the city level. As expected from previous research, all indi-
vidual worker characteristics are highly statistically significant and have the expected sign.
We also find evidence of higher wages paid by state-owned and foreign-invested enterprises
in all three sample years, relative to private and other forms of firm ownership. Overall, the
included variables explain 20-30 percent of the variance in wages. We find that the penalty
for being female is somewhat higher in 2002, and much higher in 2007, relative to 1995. The
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estimated return to education rose dramatically between 1995 and 2002, as also found by
Knight and Song (2008) using the same dataset, but was not significantly larger in 2007.
Our focus is the estimated elasticity of the wage with respect to the market access of the
worker’s location, shown as the top row of results in Table 3.3. The estimated coefficient for
market access is highly significant in all three sample years, but it doubles in value between
the 1995 sample and the 2002 sample, from 0.079 to 0.159. It increases slightly from 2002 to
2007, when the estimated coefficient is 0.191, but the difference between the two estimates
is not significant while the earlier jump is highly so.18 These estimates indicate that an
advantageous location increased in value during the intensive domestic reform period of the
late 1990s and remained stable at the higher level after China joined the WTO in 2001.
Table 3.4 provides similar estimates, but here we include fixed effects specific to each worker’s
sector and geographic region. If the results in Table 3.3 are influenced by unobserved regional
characteristics, they should change when we use the variation among workers in the same
sector and region to estimate the coefficient values. As shown in Table 3.4, the estimated
elasticity of the wage with respect to the market access of the worker’s city changes very
little when we include sector-by-region fixed effects. Indeed, the elasticity increases a bit,
rising to 0.089 for the 1995 sample and 0.2 for both 2002 and 2007. Again, the difference in
the estimated elasticity is significant for 1995 vs. 2002, with no significant difference in the
estimated coefficients between 2002 and 2007. Estimated coefficients for our control variables
show little or no change when we use the more restrictive set of fixed effects.
The NEG framework allows a structural interpretation for the coefficient on market access. In
theory,b = 1/βσ, the inverse of the product of the labor share and elasticity of substitution
across manufactured varieties. Chong-En and Zhenjie (2010) (Table 3.1, column 6) draw
upon multiple sources to provide estimates of the labor share of value added in China. For
2002, their estimate of the Chinese labor share is 0.55 and for 2007 it is 0.47. Our point
18Formal tests show the 1995 and 2002 coefficient are significant different at the 0.01% level.
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estimate for b of 0.2 (Table 3.4, columns 2 and 3) and these labor share estimates imply a
substitution elasticity of 9.1 in 2002 and 10.6 in 2007. Redding and Venables (2004, p.75)
report that an elasticity of substitution of 8 or 10 is broadly consistent with independent
econometric estimates of this parameter. Thus, our wage elasticity estimates provide similar
values for the key structural parameter of the NEG model, suggesting that China’s economic
relationships increasingly resemble those present in other market economies.
3.5.3 Market access and wages within subgroups
Previous work suggests that the relationship between the location of the worker and his or
her wage differs by both the skill level of the worker and by the ownership type of the firm
employing the worker. Poncet and Hering (2010) found that in 1995 wages earned in all types
of firms were sensitive to market access, although their evidence also suggests that central
SOEs paid higher wages in these locations only because of higher living costs. Given that
SOE wages were administratively designed to offset living cost differences, these findings are
consistent with the institutions prevailing at the time. Using the Harris measure of market
access, Kamal, Lovely and Ouyang (2012) obtain qualitatively similar results for 1995 to
those obtained by Hering and Poncet, market access is a significant determinant of wages
for all firm types, but the responsiveness of wages in SOEs was significantly less than that
of private and foreign enterprise. Their results for the 2002 sample indicate a much stronger
response of SOE wages to market access than does the 1995 sample, with the estimated
elasticity more than doubling between the two years. We redo the analysis for 2002 using
market access measures derived from gravity model estimation, as in the original Poncet and
Hering approach.
Table 3.5 provides estimates by ownership type for 1995, 2002, and 2007. The interactions
between MA and ownership type, shown in rows 2-6, indicate that in 1995 only foreign-
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invested enterprise (whether wholly owned or joint ventures) are more responsive to location
that other firm types. By 2002, we find no evidence that foreign firms are more responsive
to market access than Chinese domestic firms. Consistent with the findings of Kamal et
al.(2012), we find that the responsiveness to MA by state-owned firms converges to that
of other firm types by 2002, with only a very small, but statistically significant difference,
between the 2002 and 1995 elasticity estimates (0.21 vs. 0.18). By 2007, we find no significant
difference in responsive to market access by state-owned firms and foreign firms, consistent
with wages being market disciplined for all firm types.
In Table 3.6, we provide estimates that revisit the question of whether or not the wages of
all workers reflect locational characteristics, or only those of the skilled. Defining skilled as
those with a high school diploma or above, the estimated coefficients in table 3.6 indicate
that market access influences both skilled and unskilled workers’ wages. Indeed, for all three
sample years we find very similar wage elasticities for both groups. Looking only at 2007, for
example, the estimated elasticity of the skilled wage with respect to market access is 0.208
while that estimated for the unskilled wage is 0.194. All estimates are highly statistically
significant.
3.5.4 Robustness to left-out variables and selection
The NEG framework describes an equilibrium relationship between the market access of a
location and the wages firms are able to pay in that location. As Head and Mayer (2004) note
in their overview of the empirics of agglomeration and trade, in addition to the proposition
that locations with relatively low trade costs will tend to offer higher wages, NEG models
also predict a relationship between trade costs and the spatial concentration of producers
and consumers. This observation implies that one should not test for a relationship between
market access and wages without careful consideration of whether and how one controls for
73
agglomeration. Important alternatives to NEG explanations for spatial factor price differ-
ences include exogenous locational fundamentals (as in Ellison and Glaeser (1997) “natural
advantages”), human capital externalities models that link wages to the number of skilled
workers in a location, and knowledge spillovers.
Our estimates include sector-by-region fixed effects in each cross section, arguably controlling
for both exogenous stocks of productive resources, a key source of natural advantages, and
for human capital stocks. However, knowledge spillovers are likely to be more geographically
concentrated since they rely on the flow of information within a location. To test whether
our results are driven by the presence of such spillovers, we re-estimate the wage regressions,
including the population density of each city as an additional control. Table 3.7 provides
these enhanced estimates. The estimated coefficient for population density is statistically
significant only in 2007, and it is negative. Most importantly, the estimated market- access
elasticity retains a positive sign and its statistical significance, changing little in value with
the inclusion of this additional control.
Another challenge to the relationship uncovered by the wage regressions is the selection of
higher skilled people into locations with better market access. In China over the period of
study, the household registration system was loosened, yet remained binding in the largest
and most desirable cities. Workers were not fully free to move in response to wage differ-
entials, despite extensive rural-to-urban migration. However, registration in key cities was
possible for those who attend university and obtain employment in the area. Through this
mechanism, it is possible that positive selection occurred.
To see if selection bias is present in our estimates, we make use of information on college-
entrance examination scores available in the CHIP for the 2007 sample year only. The survey
provides information on (a) whether or not the individual ever attempted the entrance
exam, and (b) if attempted, the score achieved on the exam. If selection bias is present,
the coefficient on market access should become smaller and perhaps insignificant when we
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control for individual ability. First, as shown in column (2) of Table 3.8, we include a dummy
variable for whether or not the exam was attempted. Because there is selection into the exam,
this indicator provides a simple binary measure of ability. The estimated coefficient on this
indicator is positive, as expected, and highly significant. The estimated coefficient on MA,
however, barely moves from that of the baseline regression shown in column (1). We then
restrict our analysis to the sample of individuals who report an exam score and find similar
results, as shown in column (3). The estimated coefficient on the exam score is positive and
highly significant, but its inclusion has a very small effect on the estimated market-access
coefficient. These results lead us to conclude that bias stemming from the selection of more
able people into more desirable cities does not appear to be driving the relationship we find
between market access and wages.
A final robustness concern that we are able to address is the issue of reverse causation.
Market access is a weighted sum of expenditures, with the heaviest weight given to income
in the city itself and surrounding areas. A shock to wages in any given city will raise
incomes in that location and consequently increase MA. Previous researchers have dealt
with this issue in a number of ways, including the use of instrumental variables created with
time-invariant distance measurements. We take a second approach, which to measure MA
using only discounted market capacities for locations outside China. Given the importance
of exporting to Chinese manufacturing, foreign markets are an essential source of demand for
Chinese industries. However, it is unlikely that wages shocks inside China drive expenditures
in countries around the world.
Table 3.9 provides these additional estimates, where FMA indicates the market access index
constructed by summing only over the discounted foreign market capacities. The results
indicate that foreign market access is a positive and significant determinant of local wages,
with the point estimates larger than when we use the full MA measure. Therefore, we
conclude that the relationship between market access and wages is not driven by shocks to
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own-city incomes.
3.5.5 Magnitude of spatial wage differences and its contribution
to wage inequality
While our evidence suggests that the elasticity of the wage with respect to market access
of the worker’s location is a statistically significant phenomenon in China, how much does
it influence individual wages and how much does it contribute to spatial wage inequality?
The bulk of variation in individual wages derives from differences in human capital, sector of
employment, and occupation. Market access is another factor driving wage inequality, one
that works in addition to variation in the productive characteristics of workers. To isolate the
magnitude of the spatial dimension of wage determination, we undertake two counterfactual
exercises: the first predicts how much a particular worker can gain if he were to move from
city to city and the second assesses how much spatial variation in wages would be reduced
if all cities had the same market access.
To get at the difference location makes for nominal wages in 2007, we consider a represen-
tative Chinese man, whom we will call Zhou. Our Zhou is endowed with the mean value of
personal characteristics. To see how Zhou’s wage varies across space, we use the regression
coefficients in Table 3.3 to calculate his predicted wage if he were located in various cities
across the country. Table 3.10 provides the results of this exercise. Looking at the middle
column, we see that the Zhou’s predicted hourly wage varies from 8.37 RMB in Chengdu,
which is located in the interior, to a high of 16.24 RMB in Shanghai, which is centrally lo-
cated and on the coast. These estimates imply that the nominal wage of a worker will almost
double if he moves from an inland city to Shanghai. Even a lateral move, from Chengdu
east to Wuhan, will raise the worker’s predicted wage by 16.7 percent, which is equivalent
to another 3.5 years of education for Zhou.
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To understand how much market access contributes to wage inequality in each period, we
construct and compare predicted and counterfactual wage distributions. We obtain predicted
wages for each worker from regressions with section-by-region fixed effects, lnwi = α+Xiβ+
φsector×region + γ lnMAi. We then compute counterfactual wages by replacing lnMA with
the average of ¯ln MAsector in each sector, and computing counterfactual wages as follows,
lnwci = α + Xiβ + φsector×region + γ
¯lnMAsector. To focus attention on wage dispersion, we
then subtract the sectoral mean wage from each worker’s predicted wage before deriving
various indicators of wage inequality. Since the CHIP survey samples somewhat different
sets of cities in each wave, the city-by-year panel is unbalanced. To enhance our ability to
make valid comparisons over time, we identify cities that appear in 2007 and in at least one
of the two previous years. We use this subset of cities to form distributions for each sample
year.
Figure 3.3 provides graphs showing the predicted and counterfactual wage distributions in
1995, 2002, and 2007. As seen in the top graph, if workers all lived in cities with the
same market access, wage inequality would have been significantly less in 1995. However,
as Chinese markets became more deeply integrated, wage inequality is less affected by the
spatial variation of market access, as seen by the smaller difference between the actual and
counterfactual wages in the bottom two graphs. Still, wage dispersion in 2002 and 2007 was
influenced variation in the “value” of each location.
To be more precise about how much variation is due to market access differences across
locations, Table 3.11 provides standard errors, the 75-25 percentile differences, and 90-10
percentile differences of the distributions shown in Figure 3.3. For all three years, giving
every worker the same market access reduces wage dispersion. In 1995, the standard error
falls almost 40 percent from 0.29 to 0.18, and the 75-25 percentile/90-10 percentile decreases
from 0.38/0.74 to 0.21/0.43. In 2002, the standard error drops 20 percent from 0.3 to 0.24,
while in 2007, it falls 17 percent from 0.41 to 0.34 in 2007. Similarly, both the 75-25 and
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90-10 percentile shrink less in 2002 and 2007 than in 1995. Overall, these counterfactuals
suggest that market access does contribution to wage inequality, but that its impact has
lessened over time.
3.6 Conclusion
New economic geography suggests that the wage a firm is able to pay depends on the market
access of its location. Hering and Poncet (2010) find that variation in wages across Chinese
cities in 1995 is systematically related to differences in the predicted market access of the
worker’s location. Given the dramatic changes since 1995 in both China’s internal trade
barriers and in its integration into world markets, we investigate the strength of this rela-
tionship in 2002 and 2007. We adopt the method of Redding and Venables (2004), which
requires access to detailed Chinese customs data and the estimation of a gravity model of
international and interprovincial trade.
Our estimates suggest that spatial wage premiums within China remain large. By 2007, a
worker could almost double his or her wage by moving from an inland city to Shanghai.
We also find that much of the growth in spatial differences in wages is due to increases in
market access itself. While the “value” of market access increased substantially between 1995
and 2002, after China’s accession to the WTO the main driver of spatial wage differentials
appears to be uneven growth in the attractiveness of alternative production locations. In
particular, inland cities became relatively more attractive as the size of domestic markets
grew faster than the size of international markets.
Finally, we note that our estimates predict a value for the elasticity of substitution across
production varieties that is very similar to those estimated using developed country samples.
This finding is quite remarkable, given that our estimates are based on Mincer wage equations
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estimated on samples from Chinese cities. Similarities in these estimated parameters suggest
that China’s labor markets increasingly operate as do Western labor markets, each influenced
by linkages to external markets.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: Composition of market access, 1995, 2002, and 2007
Source: Total MA refers to total market access, as defined in the text. The average MA
value for 1995 is calculated using city MA values estimated by Hering and Poncet (2010).
MA values for 2002 and 2007 are calculated by the authors. Local MA refers to the value of
the city’s own market; intraprovincial MA refers to markets located within the own province;
interprovincial MA refers to markets located in other provinces; international MA refers to
the markets in countries other than China.
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Figure 3.2: Unconditional relationship between average wage and market access, 1995, 2002,
2007
(a) Actual
(b) Counterfactual
(c) Counterfactual
Source: These graphs plot the log of market access, as calculated by the authors, against
the log wage of each city surveyed in each CHIP sample year.
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Figure 3.3: Actual and counterfactual wage distributions, 1995, 2002, and 2007
(a) Actual
(b) Counterfactual
(c) Counterfactual
Source: These graphs plot the log of market access, as calculated by the authors, against
the log wage of each city surveyed in each CHIP sample year.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of key variables, by sample year
1995 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3)
Hourly Wage 3.240 5.790 14.08
(4.590) (3.477) (13.95)
ln Hourly Wage 1.010 1.588 2.378
(0.514) (0.588) (0.714)
Female (=1) 0.463 0.422 0.423
(0.499) (0.494) (0.494)
Years of Schooling 10.33 10.79 12.17
(2.746) (2.669) (3.380)
Age 38.53 40.56 39.76
(9.031) (8.848) (9.440)
Population Density 588.0 554.3 1065.5
(235.3) (259.8) (740.6)
Employed by State-owned Enterprise 0.766 0.569 0.578
(0.424) (0.495) (0.494)
Employed by Foreign-owned Enterprise 0.0235 0.0426 0.0417
(0.151) (0.202) (0.200)
Employed by Private Enterprise 0.00257 0.0725 0.169
(0.0506) (0.259) (0.375)
Market Access 0.0922 0.245 0.367
(0.187) (0.560) (0.506)
ln Market Access -4.136 -2.677 -1.784
(2.023) (1.298) (1.201)
Observations 5066 3544 6190
Note: Each column shows sample mean in given year. Standard devia-
tions given in parentheses. Statistics are weighted by current year popu-
lation for each city. All data except market access from China Household
Income Project. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.2: Selected Parameters from Gravity Model Esti-
mation, 1997, 2002, 2007
(1) (2) (3)
1997 2002 2007
ln Distance -1.528*** -1.466*** -1.496***
(0.024) (0.0512) (0.0582)
Contiguity 1.162*** 0.953*** 1.048***
(0.123) (0.163) (0.170)
Intra-China Border -2.766*** -0.522 0.263
(0.780) (0.535) (0.551)
China-Foreign Border -3.681*** -5.971*** -4.668***
(0.353) (0.361) (0.414)
Inter-foreign Border -1.731*** -4.755*** -4.556***
(0.320) (0.277) (0.308)
Observations 22290 24821 27144
Note: Dependent variable is log bilateral exports. Results
in column 1 replicated from Table A.3 in Hering and Pon-
cet (2010, p.159). Columns 2 and 3 show selected parameters
from estimation by authors of equation (8). Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered by city. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.3: Regressions of log wage on log market access, using
sector fixed effects, 1995, 2002, and 2007
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 2007
ln MA 0.079*** 0.159*** 0.191***
(0.016) (0.025) (0.035)
Female -0.083*** -0.109*** -0.223***
(0.014) (0.025) (0.019)
Education 0.012*** 0.039*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Age 0.038*** 0.053*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Age*Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.155*** 0.180*** 0.163***
(0.025) (0.031) (0.034)
Sino-foreign 0.267*** 0.340*** 0.209**
(0.045) (0.071) (0.086)
Sole-foreign 0.634** 0.462*** 0.387***
(0.247) (0.085) (0.079)
Private -0.029 0.047 0.050
(0.126) (0.054) (0.036)
Others 0.270*** 0.097** -0.091
(0.075) (0.042) (0.057)
R-squared 0.212 0.296 0.330
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5066 3544 6094
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Robust standard errors
in parentheses clustered by city.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.4: Regressions of log wage on log market access, using
sector-region fixed effects, 1995, 2002, and 2007
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 2007
ln MA 0.089*** 0.202*** 0.204***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.047)
Female -0.085*** -0.111*** -0.223***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.019)
Education 0.012*** 0.040*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007)
Age 0.038*** 0.051*** 0.039***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007)
Age*Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.141*** 0.169*** 0.163***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.033)
Sino-foreign 0.227*** 0.346*** 0.210**
(0.049) (0.075) (0.085)
Sole-foreign 0.554** 0.477*** 0.380***
(0.233) (0.096) (0.077)
Private -0.067 0.049 0.048
(0.111) (0.053) (0.031)
Others 0.207** 0.102** -0.089
(0.077) (0.040) (0.057)
R-squared 0.234 0.329 0.331
Sector by Region FE Yes Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5066 3544 6094
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Robust standard errors
in parentheses clustered by city.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.5: Fixed-effect regressions of log wage on log
market access, allowing for differences by firm ownership
type, 1995, 2002, and 2007
(1) (2) (3)
1995 2002 2007
ln MA 0.073*** 0.229*** 0.259***
(0.026) (0.038) (0.049)
SOE * ln MA 0.009 -0.051** -0.056
(0.028) (0.025) (0.037)
Sino-foreign * ln MA 0.051** 0.010 -0.027
(0.021) (0.043) (0.058)
Sole-foreign * ln MA 0.346*** -0.043 -0.047
(0.126) (0.069) (0.049)
Private * ln MA 0.077 0.026 -0.087**
(0.052) (0.033) (0.036)
Collective * ln MA 0.036 0.035 -0.090
(0.024) (0.022) (0.053)
State-owned -0.008 -0.083 0.087
(0.122) (0.072) (0.070)
Collective -0.059 -0.083 -0.118
(0.104) (0.051) (0.101)
Sino-foreign 0.204** 0.235** 0.172
(0.097) (0.113) (0.120)
Sole-foreign 0.777** 0.271* 0.311***
(0.341) (0.140) (0.091)
Private -0.011 0.011 -0.081
(0.198) (0.081) (0.083)
R-squared 0.238 0.338 0.332
Observations 5066 3544 6094
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Regressions in-
clude controls for the worker’s sex, education, age, and
age-squared. Sector-Region fixed effects and occupation
dummy variables included as controls. Robust standard
errors in parentheses clustered by city.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.6: Fixed-effect regressions of log wage on log market access, by worker’s educational
attainment, 1995, 2002, and 2007
With High School Diploma or above Without High School Diploma
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995 2002 2007 1995 2002 2007
ln MA 0.091*** 0.200*** 0.208*** 0.096*** 0.220*** 0.194**
(0.015) (0.026) (0.048) (0.014) (0.038) (0.067)
Female -0.077*** -0.105*** -0.222*** -0.110*** -0.151*** -0.207***
(0.015) (0.025) (0.019) (0.031) (0.047) (0.040)
Education 0.014*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.009 0.007 0.002
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.011) (0.016) (0.020)
Age 0.043*** 0.053*** 0.042*** 0.025* 0.046* 0.048
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.014) (0.024) (0.029)
Age*Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.141*** 0.154*** 0.172*** 0.148*** 0.208*** 0.101
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029) (0.040) (0.066) (0.071)
Sino-foreign 0.200*** 0.325*** 0.210** 0.316*** 0.456*** 0.054
(0.055) (0.079) (0.086) (0.109) (0.146) (0.144)
Sole-foreign 0.743*** 0.494*** 0.401*** -0.185 0.115 -0.184*
(0.166) (0.090) (0.070) (0.156) (0.289) (0.102)
Private -0.084 0.039 0.059* -0.026 0.065 -0.045
(0.128) (0.063) (0.030) (0.069) (0.083) (0.075)
Others 0.187 0.096** -0.130** 0.237* 0.117 0.053
(0.117) (0.042) (0.050) (0.126) (0.078) (0.127)
R-squared 0.238 0.317 0.323 0.254 0.293 0.193
Observations 3958 2980 5465 1108 564 629
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by
city. Sector-Region fixed effects and occupation dummy variables included as controls.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.7: Fixed-effect regressions of log wage on log market
access, controlling for local density, 1995, 2002, and 2007
1995 2002 2007
(1) (2) (3)
ln MA 0.098*** 0.195*** 0.276***
(0.017) (0.029) (0.037)
Female -0.085*** -0.113*** -0.223***
(0.014) (0.023) (0.018)
Education 0.013*** 0.040*** 0.046***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Age 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Age*Age -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.192***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.030)
Sino-foreign 0.215*** 0.294*** 0.247***
(0.048) (0.072) (0.084)
Sole-foreign 0.524** 0.425*** 0.403***
(0.251) (0.094) (0.075)
Private -0.074 -0.000 0.068**
(0.109) (0.050) (0.029)
Ln Pop Density -0.084 0.032 -0.172***
(0.073) (0.055) (0.049)
R-squared 0.223 0.329 0.342
Sector by region FE Yes Yes Yes
Occupation dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4906 3523 6094
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Robust standard er-
rors in parentheses clustered by city. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05,
∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.8: Fixed-effect regressions of log wage on log market
access, controlling for measures of individual ability, 2007
sample only
(1) (2) (3)
ln MA 0.204*** 0.201*** 0.218***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.023)
Ever attempted 0.121***
(0.024)
Exam Score (100pts) 0.147***
(0.014)
Female -0.223*** -0.221*** -0.191***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028)
Education 0.044*** 0.036*** 0.012**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Age 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.038**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016)
Age*Age -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.163*** 0.157*** 0.049
(0.033) (0.032) (0.054)
Sino-foreign 0.210** 0.207** 0.279**
(0.085) (0.084) (0.125)
Sole-foreign 0.380*** 0.368*** 0.293***
(0.077) (0.076) (0.095)
Private 0.048 0.045 -0.035
(0.031) (0.031) (0.059)
Others -0.089 -0.095 -0.287**
(0.057) (0.059) (0.116)
R-squared 0.331 0.335 0.360
Sector by region FE Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6094 6094 1790
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Ever attempted indi-
cates whether or not the individual has ever taken the Chinese
College Entrance Exam. Exam score is the score achieved on
the Entrance Exam and the regression in Column 3 is esti-
mated using only those individuals who took the exam and
reported a score. Robust standard errors in parentheses clus-
tered by city. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.9: Regressions of log wage on log foreign
market access, using sector fixed effects, 2002, and
2007
(1) (2)
2002 2007
ln FMA 1.667*** 1.377***
(0.210) (0.177)
Female -0.108*** -0.221***
(0.024) (0.017)
Education 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.004) (0.006)
Age 0.048*** 0.038***
(0.009) (0.007)
Age*Age -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
State-owned 0.178*** 0.179***
(0.030) (0.032)
Sino-foreign 0.361*** 0.236**
(0.081) (0.091)
Sole-foreign 0.535*** 0.431***
(0.095) (0.066)
Private 0.030 0.053
(0.054) (0.035)
Others 0.101** -0.103*
(0.041) (0.053)
R-squared 0.305 0.345
Sector by Region FE Yes Yes
Occupational Dummies Yes Yes
Observations 3544 6094
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Robust
standard errors in parentheses clustered by city.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 3.10: Predicted 2007 wage for Zhou in various cities
Zhou’s Work Location
Zhou’s Predicted
2007 Wage (RMB)
% wage gain by move from Chengdu
Chengdu, Sichuan Province 8.37 -
Hefei, Anhui Province 9.60 14.7%
Wuhan, Hubei Province 9.77 16.7%
Nanjing, Jiangsu Province 11.14 33.1%
Guangzhou, Guangdong Province 12.53 49.7%
Shanghai 16.24 94.0%
Predicted wage calculated using a common set of individual characteristics (our representative Zhou)
and the regression coefficients in column 3 of Table 3. The 2007 CHIP includes each of these cities.
Table 3.11: Dispersion of log wage, actual and counterfactual, 1995, 2002, 2007
1995 2002 2007
Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual Actual Counterfactual
S.D. 0.29 0.18 0.3 0.24 0.41 0.34
75-25 0.38 0.21 0.34 0.32 0.58 0.5
90-10 0.74 0.43 0.79 0.6 1.06 0.89
Observations 1232 1002 6094
Based on subset of cities in the CHIP sample. Statistics are for deviations of log(wage) from sector-
region means. The row labeled S.D. lists the standard deviation of the actual or counterfactual
wage distribution.
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Chapter 4
Techno-industrial FDI Policy and
China’s Export Surge
(Co-authored with Mary E. Lovely and Hongsheng Zhang)
4.1 Introduction
Following its accession to the World Trade Organization, China’s exports surged, rising from
$57 billion in 2001 to $250 billion by 2008.1 In industrial sectors where Chinese market share
soared, importing countries experienced the disruption of geographically concentrated job
losses. In the United States, net imports from China grew especially quickly and manufac-
turing employment, which had declined steadily for 20 years, fell by 18% between March
2001 and March 2007 (Pierce and Schott, 2016). Although other factors clearly contributed
to these losses, competition from China was a particularly salient explanation for manufac-
1Enright (2017, p.38) reports that in 2013 FIEs accounted for 47% of China’s exports, indicating that
their importance for China’s trade relations has not diminished in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
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turing job losses in America.2
Explanations for the rapid growth in Chinese exports vary. Autor et al. (2013) emphasize
productivity growth of Chinese domestic firms as a key driver of export growth to the
US. The dynamic nature of China’s manufacturing sector and sustained growth in total
factor productivity are confirmed by Brandt et al. (2012). Other researchers emphasize the
resolution of trade policy uncertainty stemming from the granting to China of permanent
normal trade relations (PNTR) by the US. Handley and Limao (2015) relate the resolution
of policy uncertainty directly to Chinese export growth at the product level, while Feng
et al. (2017) document the simultaneous entry and exit of exporters to the US, as well as
improvements in their product quality.
Each of these explanations provides important insights, and each has empirical support.3
Because it is a large and complex phenomenon, China’s export surge was, in all likelihood,
propelled by simultaneous shocks to Chinese supply, trade policies, and multinational supply
chains. What is missing from this rich menu of explanations, however, is an active role
for Chinese industrial policy in midwifing the export surge. Rather than influencing its
export profile solely through market reforms and reductions in trade barriers, throughout
the decade following its WTO accession China’s foreign investment policies promoted export
upgrading and the development of high-technology capabilities. China’s leadership initially
directed foreign investment to sectors that would spur exports and provide foreign exchange
earnings, but gradually transitioned to promoting investment in sectors that would further
industrial development (Enright, 2016). These policy directions were made clear in 2007,
when China’s guidance to foreign investors included special efforts to attract investors in
2A cottage industry has developed attributing various American social ills to China’s export surge. These
papers are cited in numerous newspaper articles and blog posts (see https://www.nytimes.com/2014/
04/02/opinion/edsall-is-the-american-middle-class-losing-out-to-china-and-india.html for a
prominent example) and some of the most well-cited are collected at the popular website http://
chinashock.info
3In addition to the studies cited above, see Ebenstein et al. (2014), which considers trade and offshoring.
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hundreds of advanced sectors. 4
Chen and Naughton (2016) define techno-industrial policy as direct government intervention
to promote high-technology industries and to upgrade traditional sectors. While Chen and
Naughton (2016) document the post-WTO-accession planning of technology-related maga-
projects, our attention is focused on how China shaped its export performance through the
regulation of foreign investment. Our primary goal is to identify the effect of changes in FDI
policy on the number, exporting status, and export volumes of foreign-invested enterprises
(FIEs) operating in China. Given that during the decade ending in 2010, foreign enterprises
accounted for more than half of all Chinese exports (with a high of 58% reached in 2005 and
2006), changes in the treatment of foreign investment is a potentially important explanation
for the export surge of the period.5
China’s unilateral revisions of its foreign investment policies in 1997, 2002, and 2007 provide
an opportunity to assess the impact of these regulatory changes on the presence and per-
formance of foreign enterprises operating in China. Our differences-in-differences analysis
strongly supports the view that Chinese preferential FDI policies were effective in shaping
and promoting exports. We find that favorable treatment of foreign investment in a par-
ticular sector promotes entry of foreign firms that export and raises export values in the
targeted industry. We triple difference the data to guard against our results being driven by
general export promotion policies or changes in China’s comparative advantage that impact
an entire sector. Our results show a significantly different effect of FDI policy changes on
foreign-owned firms in sectors that receive favorable treatment, relative to domestic peers
in the same sector. Indeed, our reduced-form calculations imply that these policies explain
4Chinese industrial policy in the years between WTO accession and the Great Recession is often charac-
terized as targeting the reduction of negative social disruptions stemming from reforms of the late 1990s and
WTO-accession-related market openings. However, as we show below, during this period China preferenced
foreign investment in sectors deemed important for technology upgrading, even while liberalizing its foreign
investment regime to meet explicit WTO mandates. See (Naughton, 2017) for a discussion of the slowdown
in reforms following WTO accession.
5Enright (2016) provides several descriptive tables detailing the importance and performance of FIEs in
China from 1993 to 2013.
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at least 14% of the increase in Chinese exports over the decade. These findings indicate
the efficacy of Chinese FDI policy in attracting foreign exporters, raising Chinese export
volumes, and shifting China’s export profile toward high-technology sectors.
The differencing method we use are common to the literature, and we draw upon an extraor-
dinary amount of data to implement these analytical techniques. To examine the common
trends assumption implicit in the method, we examine export entry and volumes both be-
fore and after changes in FDI policy. Trends for preferenced industries show no discernible
difference from those of industries not so designated. We also consider the possibility of
alternative explanations for exporter entry during the period, including the reduction in
uncertainty stemming from granting of PNTR to China. While we find that this factor did
leada to entry and higer export volumes, its inclusion in our regressions has no impact on
the magnitude of the policy effects that we identify. To further assess the robustness of
our estimates, we employ detailed China Customs data to estimate the effect of FDI policy
changes on both the intensive and extensive of exporting, both for exports in general and to
the United States in particular.
The magnitude of the effect of preferential policy on exports appears to be large. Coun-
terfactuals calculated using our reduced form estimates suggest that up to one-quarter of
the export surge may be the result of changes in FDI regulation. We also find that the
policies do act as techno-industrial policy in that they shift China’s export composition to-
ward high-technology industries, raising the high-tech share of exports by about 5 percentage
points.
Provide a preview of the paper’s structure here.
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4.2 Foreign-Invested Enterprises and Chinese Exports
Significant foreign investment from regions other than Taiwan and Hong Kong began to flow
into China by the middle of the 1990s. Attracted by the growing domestic market, many of
these investors were quickly disillusioned by rising costs for specialized resources, difficulties
with local joint venture partners, and unexpectedly low returns. According to Branstetter
and Lardy (2006), even as FDI levels began to fall in the late 1990s, the Chinese government
was negotiating terms for WTO accession that dramatically expanded the freedom of foreign
firms to operate in China. Among these reforms were reduced regulatory barriers in some
sectors and greater freedom to operate as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise (WFOE) rather
than as a joint venture (JV) with a Chinese partner. This liberalization, coupled with an
expanding domestic economy, led to increased levels of FDI each year from 2000 through
2008 (Enright, 2017, p.37).
As shown in Table 4.4, foreign invested enterprises are a very important source of Chinese
exports. In 2000, FIEs provided 45.7% of exports to all destinations. Surprisingly given the
dynamic nature of China’s domestic private sector documented by Brandt et al. (2017), the
share of exports originating in a foreign enterprise rose to almost 59% by 2005, before falling
back to 48.9% by 2008. These trends indicate what export data explicitly show: exports
from FIEs rose faster than exports from domestic firms throughout the period of China’s
“export surge.” The second data column adds another dimension to our understanding of
the surge. The share of exports qualifying for special Customs treatment as “processing
exports,” implying that they are produced with significant shares of imported materials, was
60% in 2000 and fell ever so slightly over the period.
When we consider exports to the United States only, we see that FIEs are an even more
likely source of goods. The FIE share of exports to the US was 52.2% in 2000, rising to
67.5% by 2006 before falling back a bit to 58.5% by 2008. Moreover, exports to the US are
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more likely than not to be produced under a processing Customs regime. In sum, despite
almost a decade of growth in domestic manufacturing capabilities, by 2008 China’s exports
remained heavily dependent on foreign-invested enterprises and global value chains.
4.3 FDI Policy as Industrial Policy
From its opening to foreign investors, the Chinese government has actively shaped the or-
ganizational form and the sectoral composition of direct investment inflows. The first reg-
ulations guiding foreign investment were issued in 1995, the Interim Provisions on Guiding
Foreign Investment and the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries.
The “Catalogue” was amended many times and it provided broadly defined constraints and
opportunities for foreign investors. China’s sectoral approach to FDI policy is evident in
the nature of the guidance, which targets particular sectors for preference or restriction.
Since 2002, the Catalogue has classified investment into particular sectors as encouraged, re-
stricted, and prohibited categories, in accordance with a separate set of regulations adopted
in connection with WTO accession (Enright, 2017, p.14). Investment into industries not
listed in the Catalogue is permitted, unless prohibited by other regulations. Investors into
encourage sectors may enjoy preferential treatment, such as expedited permitting, access to
scarce materials or enhanced market access, although the details of specific entry conditions
are not publicly known. All forms of ownership are possible in encouraged sectors, although
additional restrictions may apply. Investment into restricted sectors requires case-by-case
approval, and then often only in the form of a joint venture with limited foreign control.
Prohibited sectors are those in which no foreign investment is allowed.6
We use this classification system and changes over time in the Catalogue’s guidance to
characterize China’s sector-based investment policies. Specifically, we draw upon the careful
6This discussion draws from Enright, 2017, pp. 14-16, who provides additional detail.
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coding by Sheng and Yang (2016) of the Catalogue text into binary codes denoting the policy
stance for all 480 four-digit SCIC sectors from 1998 to 2008. The Catalogue was substantially
amended in 2002, 2004, and 2007, producing both cross-sectional and time-series variation
in the policies we analyze. According to Enright (2016), the 2007 changes are particularly
important as they embody a concerted attempt to move China’s export profile away from
low value-added processing activities and sectors considering resource intensive or highly
polluting toward desired high-technology activities.
To illustrate the changing nature of these FDI guidelines, we sort the 29 two-digit SCIC
manufacturing sectors into four descriptive groups. The first group, high technology, contains
sectors that include industries identified in China’s high-technology yearbooks. The second
group, fragmented, includes industries in two sectors, electrical machines and transport
equipment, both of which have very high levels of production occurring through foreign-
invested enterprises.7 These sectors are deeply embedded into global value chains. The third
group, capital intensive, contains industries that have high levels of capital per worker and
that are not included elsewhere. Firms in these industries are more likely to be state-owned
than those in other groups. The last group, labor intensive, contains industries with low
levels of capital per worker.
Figure 4.1 shows the share of all four-digit industries in each of our four groups that are en-
couraged (panel a) or restricted (panel b). The graph indicates that the share of encouraged
industries is highest in the high-technology group, followed by capital-intensive industries
and fragmented industries. All groups experience an increase in the share of industries
that are encouraged in 2002, with the largest increase in share encouraged occurring for
the capital-intensive group. In 2007, all groups again experience an increase in the share of
industries encouraged, with the jump again largest for the capital intensive sector. Despite
7If we sort these sectors by capital per worker, electrical machines would be placed into the labor-
intensive group and transport equipment would be placed into capital-intensive group. Neither is included
in the Chinese High-Technology Yearbooks.
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these changes, high-technology industries are the most likely to be encouraged, with 60% of-
fering investors preferential treatment. This high share indicates that the Chinese approach
to FDI policy, well before the recent ‘Made in China 2025’ campaign, can be characterized
as “techno-industrial policy.”
Panel b shows that the share of industries in which investment is restricted has declined for
all sectors, although there was little change in policy for labor-intensive sectors until 2007
when almost all restrictions were removed. Particularly noteworthy are the large declines
in the restricted share of industries considered high-tech or fragmented in 2002. The policy
shift in the fragmented group is pronounced, with 23% of industries restricted prior to 2002
and no industries restricted after 2002.
To further explore the nature of these policy designations, we estimated a linear probability
model for both the encouraged and restricted designation. The results of this regression,
which pools all sectors observed in the years 1995 through 2007, are shown in Table 4.5.
The coefficient values provide partial correlation coefficients for the selected industry char-
acteristics and the binary policy indicator. As regressors, we include industry characteristics
that are mentioned as determinants of Chinese policy in the literature. These characteristics
are the industry’s capital intensity, measured by its 1998 capital-labor ratio, whether or not
the industry appears in the Chinese high-technology yearbooks, the state-ownership share of
industrial output, and two measures of pollution intensity (COD intensity, which measures
water pollution intensity, and SO2 intensity, which measures a form of air pollution inten-
sity). As can be seen in column (1) and (2), only the high-technology dummy is statistically
significant and relatively large, whether or not we control for pollution intensity. This implies
that high-tech status is a good predictor of whether or not an industry is encouraged. When
we look at the results in columns (3) and (4), we see that only capital intensity is a good
predictor of whether or not a sector is restricted and that this correlation is not large.
Given the importance of FIEs to China’s export volume and the encouragement given in-
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vestors in high-technology sectors, we next explore the exporting behavior of foreign and
domestic firms in this sector compared to all other sectors. As shown in Figure 4.2, among
domestic firms export values grow steadily in all industries, high-technology and others.
However, among foreign-invested firms, exports from the high-technology sector grow faster
than those in other sectors, more than quadrupling in value before falling off slightly with
the Great Recession.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Empirical specifications
To identify the effects of the Chinese FDI policy on the FIE’s entry and exports, we exploit
the variation in the changes of industry FDI regulation in 1998-2010 using the following
generalized differences-in-differences (DD) specification:
lnYjt = α + β1Encouragedjt + β2Restrictedjt + µj + ηt + εjt, (4.1)
where Yjt indicates the log of outcomes: ln(number of firms) as firm entry, ln(number of
exporters) as exporter entry , and ln(export values) of industry j in year t. Encouragedjt
indicates whether the industry j has any encouraged item in the FDI catalogue in year t.
Restrictedjt indicates whether the industry j has any restricted item in the FDI catalogue
in year t. We drop industries that contain activities designated as forbidden items in the
catalogue. The left out neutral category includes all the industries that are neither encour-
aged nor restricted. The parameters of interest are β1 and β2. β1 (β2) measures the effect of
FDI encouragement (restriction) on a series of FIE outcomes.
To aid inference, we include a set of year dummies when estimating (4.1). The coefficients on
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these dummies capture temporal changes in FIE activity common to all industries. We also
include a set of industry dummies, indicators for the four-digit SCIC sector of the investor.
These coefficients capture differences in the attractiveness of sectors for investment. All
regressions are two-way clustered at the four-digit SCIC industry and year level to avoid
upward bias when estimating standard errors.
4.4.2 Discussion of identification assumptions
The identification relies on the important assumption that industries with and without pol-
icy changes would have similar trends of outcome variables. In this section, we examine the
potential threats to the assumption. The primary threat to the “no pre-trend” assumption
is policy endogeneity. If the change of FDI policy is driven by unobservable industry char-
acteristics that correlate with outcomes, the estimates will be biased. We examine whether
the policy endogeneity leads to different pre-trends for industries with and without policy
change using the following event study framework:
lnYjt = α +
4∑
t=−3
β1tEncouragedjt +
4∑
t=−3
β2tRestrictedjt + µj + ηt + εjt, (4.2)
The explanatory variables include seven policy-by-year dummies, Encouragedjt andRestrictedjt,
which denote 3 years before the change of the FDI policy to 4 years after. Period 0 denotes
the year of policy change. The coefficients of interest, βit, (i = 1, 2), measure how the out-
come variables evolve over the seven years’ period. In the regression analysis, year before
the policy change is left out as the baseline. Since the main policy changes happened around
year 2002, we concentrate on the years between 1999 and 2006.
The event study analysis provides an examination of pre-trends in outcome variables. We
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do not find significant trends in outcomes before the change of FDI policy. The estimates
for years after the policy enactment indicate the dynamic effects of FDI policy changes. We
graphically show the how the treatment effects evolved over time in Figure 4.3.
4.4.3 Policy endogeneity, triple-differences (DDD) method
The DD framework in equation (4.1) identifies the effect of FDI regulation through industry-
by-year changes in FDI policy. A remaining concern, however, is that FDI policy changes
are correlated with time-variant, industry-specific unobserved factors. A likely possibility is
that exogenous technological change within a global industry makes China a more attractive
location for production. If Chinese officials respond to the enhanced investment environment
for China by encouraging firm entry, FDI policy is endogenous to firm behavior. Such policy
endogeneity would create a correlation between FDI policy and FIE entry These concerns
are important and we address them with a triple differencing approach that makes use of
the fact that FDI policy affects only foreign firms and not domestic firms. If technological
innovation makes China a more attractive location for a particular industry, both foreign and
domestic firms should be affected by it. In this case, even though the government encourages
foreign firm entry, we should observe entry by both foreign and domestic firms.
These considerations motivate a triple-differences model, using domestic firms as a within-
industry control group, with the following specification:
lnYijt = α + β1Encouragedjt × FIEi + β2Restrictedjt × FIEi
+ γ1Encouragedjt + γ2Restrictedjt + FIEi × µj + FIEi × ηt
+ FIEi + µj + ηt + εjt,
(4.3)
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Besides the key interaction term of FDI policy variables and FIE status, we include FIE-by-
year dummies, FIE-by-industry dummies, and FIE dummies. The coefficients of interest are
β1 and β2, which identify the effects of FDI policy as their differential impacts on outcomes
of FIEs and Domestics.
To make the most of accessing to the rich transaction-level China Customs Records, we
also run similar DDD specifications to examine both intensive and extensive margins for all
countries and US only.
We define the intensive margin as the export value of continuous exporters by a particular
HS6-level product (00-s) to a particular country (c), where continuous exporters refer to
firms conducting exporting throughout the sample period 2000-2008. The extensive margin is
defined as the number of exporting firms within a particular HS6-level product to a particular
country (c) in year t. Then the differential policy effects on FIE and domestic enterprises
can be writte as:
lnYicst = α + β1Encouragedst × FIEi + β2Restrictedst × FIEi
+ γ1Encouragedst + γ2Restrictedst
+ FIEi + µs + µc × ηt + εjt,
(4.4)
where the dependent variable lnYicst represents log of intensive (extensive) margin for own-
ership type i, to country c, for product s, in year t.
4.5 Data Sources
The study requires detailed information on Chinese industrial firms for an extended period
of time. The main source of annual data on manufacturing firms is the annual survey of
industrial production (ASIP) for 1998-2010 which includes information for all state-owned
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industrial firms and non-state owned firms with sales above 5 million RMB. The dataset
is collected through annual surveys by National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) of China and
discussed in detail in Brandt et al. (2014). The aggregated value of exports, output, em-
ployment, sales, and capital for these firms are nearly equal to the totals reported annually
in China’s Statistical Yearbook. Compared to the universe of firms observed in the 2004
China Economic Census, our sample of above-scale industrial firms represents the most of
industrial production in China. As discussed in Brandt et al. (2017), included firms in the
ASIP data account for 91 percent of gross output, 71 percent of employment, 97 percent of
exports, and 91 percent of total fixed assets in 2004 census survey year.
The sample represents firms among four-digit Standard Chinese Industry Classification
(SCIC) manufacturing industries that are surveyed annually from 1998 to 2010. The SCIC
system is comparable to the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) system used in the
U.S. During the sample period, the SCIC codes updated to a new version (GB/T4754-
2002). Thus, we converted the old version (GB/T4754-1994) of SCIC codes using Dean
et al. (2009)’s concordance table for years before 2002.
We utilized information on firms’ registered types (variable dengji zhuce leixing) to identify
firms’ ownership types.8 Following Brandt et al. (2017), we also determine firm’s ownership
type based on the largest ownership share in registered capital. Thus, firms’ ownership
types can be classified into four categories: state, private, foreign, and Hong Kong, Macao
or Taiwan (HKMT). Foreign type includes both wholly-owned-foreign-invested enterprises
(WOFEs) and joint ventures with local governments (JVs). For the purpose of this analysis,
we then aggregate the firm-level data into industry level to acquire the total number of firms,
exporters, and aggregated export values for each ownership type.
To control for the effect of import tariff at SCIC 4-digit level, we use input tariff and out-
8Stipulations on how to distinguish firm ownerships between registered types can be found on the website
of China’s NBS: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjbz/200610/t20061018_8657.html.
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put tariff downloaded from the online appendix of Brandt et al. (2017) which is available
at https://feb.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/. Input tariffs are aggre-
gated by weighted average of output tariffs using the industry shares from the Chinese 2002
Input-Output table. For CCR regressions at the HS 6-digit level, we obtain Chinese import
tariff from World Bank WITS-TRAINS dataset in which the raw data are at HS 6-digit
level. We take simple average of import tariff to avoid potential bias in the industry average
because of low trade volumes in heavily protected product lines.
To isolate the effect of Permanent Normal Trade Relationship (PNTR) between China and
the US, we include NTR gap calculated by the difference between ad valorem equivalent
NTR and non-NTR tariff rates following Pierce and Schott (2016). The data for computing
NTR gap from 1989 to 2001 are from Feenstra, Romalis, and Schott (2002). We use the NTR
gap for 1999, the year before the passage of PNTR in the US, in our regression analysis.
Also, the results are qualitatively robust to using the NTR gaps from any available years.
Summary statistics on four-digit SCIC industry-level dependent variables and controls can
be found in Table 4.1.
The FDI policy data used in the paper are from Sheng and Yang (2016). They constructed
a unique measure of ownership liberalization using the official government list of industries
that were encouraged, restricted, or prohibited for foreign investment. This list, provided
in the Catalogue for the Guidance of Foreign Investment Industries (NDRC, various years),
was first published in 1995 and was revised subsequently in 1997, 2002, 2004, and 2007.
In encouraged industries, foreign investors given more freedom to choose their ownership
structures and enjoyed other advantages, such as preferable corporate tax rates, low land
costs, and duty-free imported inputs. By contrast, the Chinese government imposed stringent
restrictions on ownership structures and high entry costs for foreign investors in restricted
or prohibited industries. Summary statistics of policy variables for policy changing years are
shown in Table 4.2.
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Export flows by trade type (ordinary or processing trade), by destination country and by
ownership category are from China’s Custom Office for the period 2000-2008 which record
the value and quantity of every transaction that passes through China’s customs and are
aggregated to the 6-digit Harmonized System (HS) product level. Since HS code versions
were updated in 1996 (H1), 2002 (H2) and 2007 (H3) during the sample period, we use
concordances obtained from the World Bank’s WITS dataset9 to convert HS codes in each
year to H1. we use the HS-SCIC concordance table constructed by the NBS and extended
further by Brandt et al. (2017) to obtain export flows by trade type and by destination
country at 4-digit SCIC level that we use in industry-level analysis. Since the currency unit
in ASIP dataset is thousand RMB, which is different from the unit used in CCR data (US
dollar), we convert export values from US dollar to thousand RMB using official exchange
rate (RMB per US$, period average) from World Bank WDI database.
4.6 FDI Policy and FIE Entry and Export Performance
4.6.1 Differences-in-differences Analysis
Differences-in-differences analysis identifies the effect of FDI policy changes from both cross-
sectional and time-series variation in policy designations. We expect that preferential policy,
captured by the ‘encouraged’ dummy, reduces the cost of entry for foreign firms and, thus,
promotes entry, exporting, and export volumes. We also expect that restrictions on invest-
ment, captured by the ‘restriction’ dummy, will reduce entry of foreign firms and the value
of their exports. The details of the policy are important to note, however, as restricted
sectors may be open to investment in the form of a joint venture, while wholly owned foreign
enterprises are blocked. To capture this possibility, we also divide our sample of foreign firms
9See http://wits.worldbank.org/product_concordance.html
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into joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries and analyze these separately.
Table 4.6 provides our baseline results, using four-digit industry fixed effects and year dum-
mies as controls. Robust standard errors are two-way clustered at the four-digit SCIC
industry and year level. We separately analyze samples of foreign-invested enterprises and
domestic firms.
The top panel provides results for our analysis of firm entry. As can be seen from the first
row of the panel, designating an industry as encouraged raise the number of foreign firms by
0.14 log points, an effect that is statistically significant in the full sample and for both FIE
subsamples, JV and WFOE. Reassuringly, the policy has no significant effect on entry of
domestic firms. Restrictions on foreign investors reduce their presence in a sector, as shown
in the first panel, with an estimated reduction number of WFOEs by 0.147 log points. Our
results indicate that this designation has no significant effect on the number of JV entrants,
consistent with the nature of the policy restriction on ownership and control.
The second panel provides results for DID analysis of the number of firms that export. The
estimates imply significant responses by foreign investors to encouraging policies, with the
number of FIE exporters rising by an estimated 0.153 log points. We find that the policy
raises the number of both JVs and WFOE who engage in exporting. Again, we find no
effect of FDI policy changes on domestic firms. For industries under a restrictive FDI policy,
we find that this designation significantly reduces the number of WFOE exporters, with an
estimated reduction of 0.197 log points in their number. Restrictions have no significant
effect on the number of JV exporters or domestic firms, as expected.
The bottom panel examines the response of export values to policy changes. The findings
suggest that designating a sector as encouraged raises its exports by an average of 0.357 log
points, with a large point estimate for both types of foreign firms but a statistically significant
effect only for JVs. This effect is large and we will explore it further in the following sections,
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where we add additional controls to our analysis. Turning to industries for which foreign
investment is restricted, we find that the policy reduces exports from WFOEs, although the
point estimate is not significant. However, we find that domestic firms in these industries
have higher than expected export values, with a significant point estimate of 0.195 log points.
Other studies suggest that several aspects of trade policy influenced China’s export surge.
The first of this is the granted of PNTR to China by the United States in 2001. Since this
policy change occurred at the same time as a significant revision of Chinese FDI regulations,
we need to control for it. We do so by including as a separate regressor to capture the
response of firms to the end of uncertainty in China’s trading status with the US. The
“NTR gap” is defined as the difference between the non-NTR rates to which tariffs would
have risen if annual renewal had failed and the NTR tariff rates that were locked in by PNTR
(Pierce and Schott, 2016). We also include controls for changes in Chinese domestic tariffs,
both tariffs on inputs and output tariffs.
For our purposes, the important implication of the results shown in Table 4.7 is that the
addition of this set of controls does not change the conclusions one can draw from Table
4.6. Designation as an encouraged industry raises the number of FIEs, the number of FIE
exporters, and the value of exports originating in foreign-owned firms. The point estimates
remain very similar with statistical significance reduced only for the WFOE subsample.
Results for the newly added controls are interesting in their own right. Removal of the un-
certainty of annual NTR review is positively associated with the number of FIEs and the
number of FIEs that export, with point estimates that are highly significant. We interpret
these estimates as confirmation of the mechanisms identified by Pierce and Schott (2014),
even though we do not find a significant effect on export values for FIEs overall and a nega-
tive effect on exporting by WFOEs. Higher input tariffs are associated with larger numbers
of WFOEs and higher WFOE export values. It is not obvious why WFOEs are differen-
tial affected by input tariff changes. Perhaps because many WFOEs engage in processing
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export activity, and thus import input duty-free, lower input tariffs after 2002 reduced the
advantages they enjoyed over smaller domestic rivals. Lastly, our results suggest that higher
output tariffs lead to higher numbers of JV firms and JV exporter, although they reduce
export values.
To really push our data, we generalize our approach further by allowing each industry to
have its own time trend. Table 4.8 reports results of the DID analysis, with the inclusion
of two-digit industry-specific year trends. Including these controls reduces the size of our
estimated effects, but retains the significance of the policy for FIE firm behavior. The
estimated impact of encourage status falls from 0.136 log points in Table 4.7 to 0.998 log
points when we allow for industry-specific year trends. The estimated effect on the number
of JVs, however, is changed very little as it falls from 0.131 log points to 0.112 log points
and remains highly significant. Similarly, we find that our point estimate for the number
of FIE exporters is little changed and our estimated effect on export values is higher while
remaining statistically significant.
4.6.2 Triple-differencing analysis
To guard against the possibility that policy changes are correlated with unobservable factors
that influence the general level of entry and exporting in an industry, we estimate the impact
of FDI policy on foreign firms by treating domestic firms in the same sector as a control
group. These triple-differencing results are shown in Table 4.9. The entries provide estimated
coefficients that measure the impact of FDI policy changes on foreign firms relative to their
domestic counterparts. As controls, we include industry and year fixed effects, as well as
additional variables that allow ownership specific levels and trends – ownership x industry,
ownership x year, and ownership fixed effects.
The triple-differenced results support inferences drawn from the DID analysis. Encouraging
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policy raises the number of FIEs relative to the number of domestic firms in the same industry
by 0.115 log points overall, with significant effects for both the JV and WFOE subsample.
Again we find that restrictions reduce WFOE entry relative to the number of domestic firms,
with designation as a restricted sector associated with a 0.127 log points reduction in wholly
owned FIEs. Panel B provides estimates that support the finding that encouraging policy
increases the number of FIE exporters relative to domestic exporters, with the point estimate
of 0.18 log points being highly significant. Finally, Panel C provides strong evidence that
FDI policy influences export values. Relative to their domestic peers, designation as an
encouraged sector raises FIE export values by a very large 0.753 log points, with strong
and significant responses found in both the JV and WFOE subsamples. WFOE exports in
restricted sectors are much lower than those from domestic firms, with an estimated 0.54 log
points reduction in WFOE export values relative to domestic firms. Such large estimated
policy impacts raise the question of whether FDI regulation is used to boost Chinese exports
in desired sectors, with project approvals favoring those that target foreign markets. We
have no direct evidence to support such an interpretation, but these results suggest that
further analysis is needed to understand the mechanisms by which FDI policy influences
trade flows.
4.6.3 The margins of exporting
Using the detailed China Customs Records, we investigate the effect of FDI policy changes
on the margins of exporting, again using a triple-differencing approach. We expect that
the policy, which appears to be focused on entry, would influence the extensive margin
of exporting more strongly than the intensive margin of exporting by incumbent firms. To
further explore the nature of the response, we also divide exports into processing exports and
normal exports, as defined by China Customs. Processing exports are those produced with
intermediate inputs imported tariff-free on the condition that they not be sold domestically.
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We also consider two export samples: exports to all destinations (Table 4.10) and exports
to the United States only (Table 4.11).
As seen in Table 4.10, incumbent FIEs in encouraged industries export significantly more
than their domestic peers. Indeed, we estimate that the intensive margin of exporting is 0.40
log points higher for Sino-foreign JVs in encouraged sectors than for their domestic peers.
Moreover, our estimates suggest that this response is evident mainly in normal exports,
which have higher domestic content than processing exports. Policy restrictions significantly
deter FIE export volumes for incumbent foreign exporters relative to their domestic peers.
This depressing effect appears to be significant for normal exporters by all FIEs and for
processing exports by WFOEs only.
Turning to Chinese exports to the United States, presented in Table 4.11, we find similar
patterns in the data. The main contrast with the results estimated for all exports is that
the estimated impacts on exports to the US appear to be larger, likely driven by the sectoral
composition of the bilateral trade relationship. As an example, designating a sector as
encouraged raises the intensive margin of normal exports from JVs to the US by 0.912 log
points. Again, the size of these effects suggests that further research on the nature of the
incentives facing foreign firms operating in China is needed.
Table 4.12 presents triple-differenced estimates for the extensive margin of exporting, both
to all destinations and to the US only. As expected, we find that designating a sector as
encouraged significantly raises the number of HS6-destination pairs to which FIEs export,
with the point estimate suggesting an increase of 0.64 log points. Entry into exporting of
new products is particularly strong for FIEs serving the American market. We find that
encourage status for FIEs raises the extensive margin of exporting to the US by 0.13 log
points, and that this response occurs in both JVs and WFOEs. As before, we find that
restrictions on FDI reduce the extensive margin of exports from WFOEs, while raising them
for JVs. These responses are larger for exports to the US alone.
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4.7 Economic Significance
To evaluate the impact of FDI policy changes on Chinese export surge, we calculate the
implied changes in FIE export due to encouraged policy varying in each year based on
our reduced form estimates. While we note that FDI policy changes may also affect the
average flows of investment and, thus, the values of estimated coefficients on year or industry
dummies, we believe such general equilibrium effects to be small enough to make our analysis
of value. Counterfactual FIE export then is computed as FIE export flow that would have
occurred in the absence of changes in FDI policy. Therefore, the implied change in FIE
export in year t can be written as:
∆Exportt =
∑
j
Xjt · (eβ1·1{Encouragedjt} − 1)
β1 is to the coefficient of Encouraged dummy in the baseline regression. 1{Encouragedjt}
represent whether industry j is encouraged or not in year t. Xjt equals to the foreign export
values for industry j in year t. Figure 4.4 shows the actual and counterfactual FIE export
flows during the sample period, and FDI policy change explained nearly 27% of the total
FIE export surge. We also conduct the same exercise dropping the entire electronics sector
(SCIC:39), and the explained share of total FIE export surge becomes to 19% for this reduced
set of industries.
Based on the calculation of implied export surge, we graph two pie charts showing the share
of FIE export values by each group in 2010. Figure 4.5a shows those shares using actual
export values: Capital-intensive, fragmented, labor-intensive, and high-tech each represents
7.6%, 25.2%, 14.5%, and 52.6% of total exports. Whereas Figure 4.5b represents shares of
total exports in absence of FDI policy changes: Capital-intensive, fragmented, high-tech, and
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labor-intensive each represents 8%, 28%, 17.2%, and 46.9% of total counterfactual export
values. Comparing shares in two figures, we see that the FDI encouraging policy has the
most significant effects on promoting exports in high-tech sectors.
4.8 Conclusion
This paper closely studies the effect of Chinese industrial policy, as embodied in its regulation
of foreign direct investment, on foreign firm’s entry and exports. Our analysis strongly
supports the view that Chinese FDI policies are effective in promoting exports. We find that
favorable treatment of foreign investment in a particular sector promotes entry of foreign
firms that export, and that it raises export values in the targeted industry. We estimate
that changes in FDI policy explain almost one-quarter of China’s export surge and shifted
China’s export composition toward high-technology industries.
Despite much focus on productivity growth of China’s domestic enterprises as the key cause
for China’s export surge since its accession to the WTO, the fact and assessment of role
of foreign-invested firms operating in China have been largely overlooked in the previous
research. This study bridges this troubling gap, since about half of Chinese exports between
2000 and 2008 originated in foreign-owned enterprises. These results are relevant for current
discussion of how China uses investment policy to shape its international competitiveness.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 4.1: Share of Sectors Designated Encouraged and Restricted, by Group, 1995-2007
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Source: Policy designation at SCIC four-digit taken from Sheng and Yang (2016). Grouping
and calculations by authors.
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Figure 4.2: Export Values for Foreign and Domestic Enterprises,
High-Tech Sectors and Others, 1998-2010
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Figure 4.3: Pre-trends and Post-trends for FDI Policy Changes
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Figure 4.4: FIE Export Values, Actual v. Counerfactual, 1998-2010
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Figure 4.5: Share of FIE Export Values by Group, Actual v. Counterfactual, 2010
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for Dependent Variables
FIE JV WOFE SOE POE
ln Export Values 9.36 8.29 8.16 6.01 8.15
(6.23) (6.03) (6.33) (5.66) (5.99)
ln Num of Firms 2.38 1.95 1.78 2.13 3.23
(1.77) (1.52) (1.56) (1.68) (2.31)
ln Num of Exporters 1.95 1.48 1.49 0.90 1.84
(1.61) (1.33) (1.44) (1.03) (1.72)
Observations 7525 7525 7525 7525 7525
Mean coefficients; SD parentheses
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
All 1998 2002 2007
Encouraged 0.32 0.24 0.36 0.43
(0.47) (0.43) (0.48) (0.49)
Restricted 0.11 0.15 0.08 0.07
(0.31) (0.35) (0.28) (0.26)
NTR Gap × Post Dummies 0.19 0.00 0.30 0.30
(0.19) (0.00) (0.15) (0.16)
ln Input Tariff 2.23 2.47 2.14 1.93
(0.43) (0.30) (0.31) (0.25)
ln Output Tariff 2.50 2.78 2.42 2.16
(0.76) (0.59) (0.65) (0.73)
Observations 7525 471 470 470
mean coefficients; sd in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 4.4: Export Shares, All Destinations and US Only, 2000-2008
All Destinations US Only
Year FIE Share Processing Share FIE Share Processing Share
2000 0.457 0.601 0.522 0.707
2001 0.502 0.602 0.542 0.699
2002 0.531 0.598 0.580 0.697
2003 0.559 0.601 0.625 0.702
2004 0.578 0.603 0.660 0.699
2005 0.589 0.598 0.671 0.679
2006 0.587 0.580 0.675 0.661
2007 0.545 0.565 0.648 0.657
2008 0.489 0.544 0.585 0.632
Source: China Customs Records and calculations by authors.
Table 4.5: Linear Probability Models of Policy Designations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Encouraged Encouraged Restricted Restricted
Capital-Labor Ratio (1998) 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
High-Tech Dummy 0.297∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.046 0.034
(0.070) (0.067) (0.029) (0.032)
SOE Output Share 0.055 0.005 0.016 0.009
(0.124) (0.134) (0.065) (0.069)
COD Intensity 0.001 -0.000
(0.002) (0.001)
SO2 Intensity 0.011 -0.005
(0.009) (0.004)
Observations 6182 5770 6182 5770
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Note: Dependent variables are policy designations for CIC four-digit sectors from Sheng
and Yang (2016). Other data sources described in text. Pooled observations, 1995-2007.
Robustness standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the industry and
year level. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4.6: Regression DD Estimates of FDI Policy Effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FIE JV WOFE Domestic
(Panel A: Depvar = ln Number of Firms)
Encouraged 0.141∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.077
(0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.059)
Restricted -0.005 0.029 -0.147∗∗ -0.034
(0.045) (0.039) (0.067) (0.062)
(Panel B: Depvar = ln Number of Exporters)
Encouraged 0.153∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.101∗ 0.021
(0.047) (0.041) (0.055) (0.069)
Restricted -0.047 0.024 -0.197∗∗ 0.000
(0.049) (0.042) (0.074) (0.065)
(Panel C: Depvar = ln Export Values)
Encouraged 0.357∗∗ 0.382∗ 0.261 -0.171
(0.141) (0.177) (0.185) (0.123)
Restricted 0.173 0.207 -0.493 0.195∗
(0.153) (0.195) (0.329) (0.104)
Observations 5615 5483 5194 5425
Note: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-
in-differences (DD) regressions. Dependent variables are log
of indicated quantities in four-digit CIC industry j in year
t. Independent variables representing Chinese FDI policy
are dummies indicating whether a certain industry is en-
couraged, restricted, or not. All regressions include indus-
try and year fixed effects. Clustered robust standard errors
in parentheses. Source of export data is the ASIP.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4.8: Regression DD Estimates, with Industry-Specific Year Trends
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FIE JV WOFE Domestic
(Panel A: Depvar = ln Number of Firms)
Encouraged 0.098∗∗ 0.112∗∗ 0.044 0.013
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041)
Restricted 0.023 0.039 -0.134∗ -0.044
(0.045) (0.040) (0.073) (0.053)
(Panel B: Depvar = ln Number of Exporters)
Encouraged 0.116∗∗ 0.107∗∗ 0.053 -0.081
(0.040) (0.039) (0.047) (0.048)
Restricted -0.005 0.049 -0.180∗∗ 0.002
(0.050) (0.047) (0.075) (0.059)
(Panel C: Depvar = ln Export Values)
Encouraged 0.461∗∗ 0.333 0.425∗∗ -0.354∗∗∗
(0.154) (0.187) (0.175) (0.104)
Restricted 0.246 0.211 -0.485 0.265∗∗
(0.157) (0.212) (0.301) (0.095)
Industry Specific Year Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5615 5483 5194 5425
Note: Table reports results of OLS generalized difference-in-differences
(DD) regressions. Dependent variables are log of indicated quantities in
four-digit CIC industry j in year t. Independent variables representing Chi-
nese FDI policy are dummies indicating whether a certain industry is en-
couraged, restricted, or not. All regressions include industry and year fixed
effects. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Source of export
data is ASIP. ∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
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Table 4.9: Regression DDD Estimates of FDI
Policy Effects
(1) (2) (3)
FIE JV WOFE
(Panel A: Depvar = ln Number of Firms)
DDD Enc 0.115∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.076∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.036)
DDD Res 0.015 0.049 -0.127∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.052)
(Panel B: Depvar = ln Number of Exporters)
DDD Enc 0.180∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.041)
DDD Res -0.024 0.048 -0.173∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.058)
(Panel C: Depvar = ln Export Values)
DDD Enc 0.753∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗ 0.658∗∗
(0.181) (0.208) (0.222)
DDD Res 0.126 0.161 -0.540∗
(0.305) (0.292) (0.293)
Observations 16892 16760 16471
Note: Table reports results of triple difference-in-
differences (DDD) regressions. Dependent vari-
ables are log of indicated quantities in four-digit
CIC industry j for domestic or non-domestic en-
terprises in year t. DDD Enc and DDD Res are
triple-difference coefficients indicating the differ-
ential effects of FDI policy changes on foreign rel-
ative to domestic enterprises. All regressions in-
clude industry and year fixed effects. Addition-
ally, all regressions include ownership×industry,
ownership×year, and ownership fixed effects.
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.
Independent variables representing Chinese FDI
policy are dummies indicating whether a certain
industry is encouraged, restricted, or not. Source
of export data is the ASIP.
∗ p < .10, ∗∗ p < .05, ∗∗∗ p < .01
126
T
ab
le
4.
10
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
D
D
D
E
st
im
at
es
of
P
ol
ic
y
E
ff
ec
ts
on
In
te
n
si
ve
M
ar
gi
n
,
T
ot
al
E
x
p
or
ts
T
ot
al
E
x
p
or
t
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
E
x
p
or
t
N
or
m
al
E
x
p
or
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
D
D
D
E
n
c
0.
34
8*
*
0.
06
7
0.
40
0*
**
0.
13
0
-0
.1
80
0.
45
1*
0.
44
9*
**
0.
19
9*
0.
45
7*
**
(0
.1
30
)
(0
.1
18
)
(0
.1
16
)
(0
.2
09
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.1
97
)
(0
.1
21
)
(0
.1
04
)
(0
.1
04
)
D
D
D
R
es
-1
.9
05
**
*
-1
.9
68
**
*
-1
.2
62
**
*
-0
.6
62
-1
.7
67
**
*
0.
22
2
-1
.8
76
**
*
-1
.6
93
**
*
-1
.3
95
**
*
(0
.2
31
)
(0
.1
90
)
(0
.1
99
)
(0
.4
59
)
(0
.4
21
)
(0
.4
13
)
(0
.1
52
)
(0
.1
17
)
(0
.1
46
)
D
D
D
ln
T
ar
iff
0.
09
6
0.
14
6
0.
04
2
-0
.0
33
0.
00
8
-0
.1
23
-0
.2
30
-0
.1
71
-0
.1
75
(0
.1
33
)
(0
.1
14
)
(0
.1
29
)
(0
.2
05
)
(0
.1
96
)
(0
.1
98
)
(0
.1
55
)
(0
.1
12
)
(0
.1
39
)
ln
T
ar
iff
-0
.1
94
**
-0
.2
34
**
*
-0
.1
74
*
-0
.0
55
-0
.0
81
0.
00
6
-0
.0
62
-0
.0
89
-0
.0
69
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
79
)
(0
.1
03
)
(0
.1
02
)
(0
.1
06
)
(0
.0
76
)
(0
.0
60
)
(0
.0
73
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
29
12
24
2
29
12
24
2
29
12
24
2
11
34
46
0
11
34
46
0
11
34
46
0
26
51
59
8
26
51
59
8
26
51
59
8
N
o
te
:
T
a
b
le
re
p
or
ts
re
su
lt
s
o
f
tr
ip
le
d
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
lo
g
of
in
d
ic
at
ed
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
in
si
x
-d
ig
it
H
S
le
ve
l
fo
r
d
o
m
es
ti
c
o
r
n
o
n
-d
o
m
es
ti
c
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
in
ye
ar
t.
D
D
D
E
n
c
an
d
D
D
D
R
es
ar
e
tr
ip
le
-d
iff
er
en
ce
co
effi
ci
en
ts
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ti
al
eff
ec
ts
o
f
F
D
I
p
ol
ic
y
ch
an
ge
s
on
fo
re
ig
n
re
la
ti
v
e
to
d
om
es
ti
c
en
te
rp
ri
se
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
an
d
co
u
n
tr
y
-b
y
-y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
C
lu
st
er
ed
ro
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
re
p
re
se
n
t-
in
g
C
h
in
es
e
F
D
I
p
ol
ic
y
a
re
d
u
m
m
ie
s
in
d
ic
at
in
g
w
h
et
h
er
a
ce
rt
ai
n
in
d
u
st
ry
is
en
co
u
ra
ge
d
,
re
st
ri
ct
ed
,
or
n
ot
.
S
ou
rc
e
of
ex
p
or
t
d
a
ta
is
C
h
in
a
C
u
st
om
s
R
ec
or
d
s.
*
p
<
.1
0,
*
*
p
<
.0
5,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
127
T
ab
le
4.
11
:
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
D
D
D
E
st
im
at
es
of
P
ol
ic
y
E
ff
ec
ts
on
In
te
n
si
ve
M
ar
gi
n
,
E
x
p
or
ts
to
U
S
O
n
ly
T
ot
al
E
x
p
or
t
P
ro
ce
ss
in
g
E
x
p
or
t
N
or
m
al
E
x
p
or
t
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
F
IE
W
O
F
E
J
V
D
D
D
E
n
c
1.
20
7*
**
0.
34
5
1.
08
5*
**
1.
56
5*
**
0.
65
5*
*
1.
72
4*
**
1.
11
7*
**
0.
36
9
0.
91
2*
**
(0
.1
90
)
(0
.2
32
)
(0
.2
07
)
(0
.3
30
)
(0
.2
70
)
(0
.3
02
)
(0
.2
13
)
(0
.2
28
)
(0
.2
22
)
D
D
D
R
es
-3
.3
23
**
*
-4
.0
81
**
*
-2
.3
58
**
*
-0
.9
77
*
-2
.4
49
**
*
0.
20
6
-3
.0
41
**
*
-3
.5
23
**
*
-2
.2
60
**
*
(0
.3
67
)
(0
.3
26
)
(0
.2
90
)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.4
27
)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.3
26
)
(0
.2
66
)
(0
.2
67
)
D
D
D
ln
T
ar
iff
0.
46
6*
*
0.
58
0*
*
0.
52
4*
*
-0
.2
96
0.
03
0
-0
.1
91
0.
24
0
0.
07
5
0.
43
3
(0
.1
91
)
(0
.1
92
)
(0
.2
14
)
(0
.2
18
)
(0
.2
35
)
(0
.2
33
)
(0
.2
45
)
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.2
42
)
ln
T
ar
iff
-0
.7
22
**
*
-0
.7
67
**
*
-0
.6
89
**
*
-0
.1
10
-0
.2
92
-0
.1
41
-0
.6
39
**
*
-0
.6
12
**
*
-0
.5
84
**
(0
.1
64
)
(0
.1
75
)
(0
.1
68
)
(0
.1
51
)
(0
.1
86
)
(0
.1
59
)
(0
.1
81
)
(0
.1
71
)
(0
.1
77
)
O
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
56
65
2
56
65
2
56
65
2
35
18
0
35
18
0
35
18
0
54
47
6
54
47
6
54
47
6
N
o
te
:
T
a
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
re
su
lt
s
of
tr
ip
le
d
iff
er
en
ce
-i
n
-d
iff
er
en
ce
s
re
gr
es
si
on
s.
D
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
ar
e
lo
g
of
in
d
ic
at
ed
q
u
an
ti
ti
es
in
si
x
-d
ig
it
H
S
b
y
co
u
n
tr
y
fo
r
d
om
es
ti
c
or
n
on
-d
om
es
ti
c
en
te
rp
ri
se
s
in
ye
ar
t.
D
D
D
E
n
c
an
d
D
D
D
R
es
ar
e
tr
ip
le
-d
iff
er
en
ce
co
effi
-
ci
en
ts
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
th
e
d
iff
er
en
ti
al
eff
ec
ts
of
F
D
I
p
ol
ic
y
ch
an
ge
s
on
fo
re
ig
n
re
la
ti
ve
to
d
om
es
ti
c
en
te
rp
ri
se
s.
A
ll
re
gr
es
si
on
s
in
cl
u
d
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
an
d
ye
ar
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
ts
.
C
lu
st
er
ed
ro
b
u
st
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
.
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
s
re
p
re
se
n
ti
n
g
C
h
in
es
e
F
D
I
p
ol
ic
y
ar
e
d
u
m
m
ie
s
in
d
ic
a
ti
n
g
w
h
et
h
er
a
ce
rt
ai
n
in
d
u
st
ry
is
en
co
u
ra
ge
d
,
re
st
ri
ct
ed
,
or
n
ot
.
S
ou
rc
e
of
ex
p
or
t
d
at
a
is
C
h
in
a
C
u
st
o
m
s
R
ec
o
rd
s.
*
p
<
.1
0,
*
*
p
<
.0
5,
*
*
*
p
<
.0
1
128
Table 4.12: Regression DDD Estimates of Policy Effects on Extensive Margins, Total
Exports and US Only
To All countries To the US
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FIE WOFE JV FIE WOFE JV
DDD Enc 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 0.130*** 0.129*** 0.164***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.028) (0.043)
DDD Res -0.046* -0.043* 0.081*** -0.175*** -0.156*** 0.095**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.033) (0.029)
DDD ln Tariff -0.034 -0.054** -0.033 -0.091*** -0.141*** -0.108**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.026) (0.018) (0.023) (0.033)
ln Tariff -0.067*** -0.052** -0.059** -0.146*** -0.106*** -0.115***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029)
Observations 4262156 4262156 4262156 64030 64030 64030
FE HS,C#Y HS,C#Y HS,C#Y HS,Y HS,Y HS,Y
Note: Table reports results of triple difference-in-differences regressions. Dependent vari-
ables are log of indicated quantities in six-digit HS by country for domestic or non-domestic
enterprises in year t. DDD Enc and DDD Res are triple-difference coefficients indicating
the differential effects of FDI policy changes on foreign versus domestic enterprises. Clus-
tered robust standard errors in parentheses. Independent variables representing Chinese
FDI policy are dummies indicating whether a certain industry is encouraged, restricted, or
not. Source of export data is China Customs Records. * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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